Documents / FOIA release
The CIA's Directorate of Intelligence issued this Weekly Summary, No. 0369/70, on 8 May 1970. It covers events through noon on 7 May. The Far East section deals with the allied operations into Cambodia, Hanoi's cautious response and the government in exile Sihanouk formed in Peking. Other items cover Soviet military aid, the Sino-Soviet talks, Jordan, Dahomey, Guatemala and Brazil, and a special report looks at Cuban support for subversion in Latin America. Many pages are withheld, and the summary contains no UFO material.
Approved for Release: 2023/03/28 C03154550 SE6-RBI VIETNAM: TEMPORIZING IN HANOI Hanoi has temporized so far its public reaction to the allied ground operations into Cambodia a the US air strikes against target in North Vietnam. The Communists boycotted the plenary session of the Paris talks on 6 May, but sai that they would return to the tab next week unless the bombing con- tinued. Their failure to rupture the conference completely after threatening for months to do so shows Hanoi's reluctance to close off any political options. The Communists‘ propaganda r action to the new allied moves is in the same cautious vein. They lashed out at Washington for the ground and air attacks, but care- fully avoided committing themselv to forceful retaliation. They also have made some general threa but concrete decisions on their f ture course are yet to be made. Hanoi has contended that the air strikes violate Washington's "pledge" in November 1968 to halt all bombing of the North. This could mean that the Communists, in turn, no longer feel constrain about large—scale use of the De- militarized Zone or attacks on ma jor South Vietnamese cities. Hanoi's slight delay in rec- ognizing Sihanouk's "government i exile" may be caused by the same instinct to temporize. The North Vietnamese extended recognition t the new "government" a day after was announced, but only after six countries, including China, alrea had weighed in. Unlike the Chi- nese, Hanoi has not yet announced withdrawal of its remaining per- in nd s d le e- GS ts u_- ed 1'1 O it dy sonnel from Phnom Penh. Thus, even at this late hour, the Vietnamese Communists seem to be reluctant to close off completely the possibil- ity of dealing with Lon Nol and his associates. One of the reasons for Hanoi's caution may be difficulty in con- certing with Peking and Moscow. Party First Secretary Le Duan‘s pro- longed stay abroad suggests that difficulties have cropped up. He has been away for three weeks and the Polish press reports that he took a side trip to Warsaw, leaving there on 6 May. His absence from Hanoi at such a critical time strongly suggests that the Vietnam- ese are being pulled in different directions by their principal al- lies, with Peking pressing mili- tancy and Moscow counseling modera- tion. It is also possible that Hanoi has been sufficiently surprised by the turn of events in Indochina that it needs some time to sort out all of the implications and to make new decisions. This process, however, probably would not impair the Com- munists‘ ability to react rapidly in tactical battle field situations- Communist Military Reactions Communist battlefield reactions to the US and South Vietnamese oper- ations against their long—held sanc- tuaries in Cambodia have varied, but no major efforts to stand and fight or to counterattack have developed. 3F€REJl Page 2 WEEKLY SUMMARY 8 May 70 Approved for Release: 2023/03/28 C03154550
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FOIA release, from the cia-readingroom collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is above. 78 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.