Documents / FOIA release
The CIA's Directorate of Intelligence issued this Weekly Summary, No. 0369/70, on 8 May 1970. It covers events through noon on 7 May. The Far East section deals with the allied operations into Cambodia, Hanoi's cautious response and the government in exile Sihanouk formed in Peking. Other items cover Soviet military aid, the Sino-Soviet talks, Jordan, Dahomey, Guatemala and Brazil, and a special report looks at Cuban support for subversion in Latin America. Many pages are withheld, and the summary contains no UFO material.
“Indian Air Force”1 page
Approved for Release: 2023/03/28 C03154550 lib J H ‘ <=’» a splintering of the local revolutionary movement. By early 1969, for example, all Cuban guerrilla advisers in Venezuela had been recalled to Havana and material support had been reduced so much that several guerrilla leaders complained publicly. In his speech of 22 April, Castro admitted that Cuban support had been withdrawn from groups that had constantly performed poorly, but he made it quite clear that he would back those that produce concrete results. REVOLUTIONARY THEORY REVISED Another outcome of the reassessment was a fundamental change in revolutionary theory. Previously, the Cubans had maintained that the guerrilla unit in the rural areas, basing its support on the peasants, was the focal point of the revolu- tionary movement. Units in urban areas func- tioned only in support of the rural guerrillas. In revising this concept, Castro seems to have real- ized—probably as a result of Guevara’s experience in Bolivia—that the peasant in the countryside is basically a conservative individual with a rela- tively low degree of political consciousness and therefore a poor prospect for recruitment. Castro thus has apparently adopted a more flexible doc- trine in which the students and workers of the cities—who have a greater political awareness and a more liberal bent—initiate the revolutionary process by means of urban terrorism, later moving to the rural areas to start the second—or guerrilla warfare—stage. Carlos Fonseca Amador, president of the pro-Cuban Sandino Front of National Liberation (FSLN) in Nicaragua, described the new theory in early 1969 in a critique of previous FSLN opera- tions: “Under conditions in Nicaragua—more or less the same as Latin American countries gen- erally—the center of action of the revolutionary war has to be the countryside. However, the role that the city should play also has particular im- portance, since in the first stage of the struggle rp \ the city must provide the countryside with the most developed cadres in order to direct the or- ganization of the political and militaryYdetach- ment. Generally, the urban revolutionary cells can be developed more easily in the first stage. Such elements include the revolutionary sector of the workers, the students, and a certain strata of the petit bourgeoisie.” Havana, which described Fonseca Amador as “one of Nicaragua’s finest sons,” gave its imprimatur by publishing the cri- tique in Tricontinental magazine in late 1969. MARIGHELLA’S CONTRIBUTION The same theory appeared again in Tric0n- tinental in April 1970 when Carlos Marighella’s Castro looked upon Carlos Marighella as the most kpromising guerrilla leader in Latin America. J Special Report - 5 - 8 May 1970 Approved for Release: 2023/03/28 C03154550
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FOIA release, from the cia-readingroom collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is above. 78 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.