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BACKGROUND: THE ROAD TO REFLECTION
The capture and execution of Che Guevara
in October 1967 and the subsequent destruction
of his guerrilla group in Bolivia caused Fidel Cas-
tro to pause and reflect at length on his policy of
exporting revolution. The Bolivian fiasco, which
was merely another in a long string of fruitless
and costly Cuban adventures in subversion, was a
particularly disastrous setback because the nu-
cleus of the guerrilla group consisted of l6 vet-
eran Cuban combatants-three of them members
of the Cuban Communist Party’s Central Commit-
tee~who were hand-picked and led by the man
whom Castro considered the most experienced
and daring guerrilla warfare tactician in Latin
America. The group was theoretically the best
team that Havana could field.
The startling lack of success in Bolivia be-
came apparent to Castro when he finally gained
access to Guevara’s campaign diary in the spring
of 1968. Castro found out that, far from estab-
lishing a viable guerrilla front, Guevara’s band was
constantly on the run, was barely able to survive
the harsh terrain, and was unable to recruit Boliv-
ians through his highly touted tactic of “armed
propaganda.” The circumstances of the defeat
indicated to Castro that a rethinking of Cuba’s
strategy was in order.
Special Report - 2 -
IMPROVING THE SUBVERSIVE APPARATUS
In addition, a hard look was taken at the
Interior Ministry (MININT), which is charged
with carrying out foreign intelligence operations
such as the Bolivian affair. A reorganization of
MININT was initiated in mid or late 1968 at the
same time a similar process was set in motion in
the Ministry of the Revolutionary Armed Forces
(MINFAR), another government branch deeply
involved in subversion. That this shake-up was
long overdue became even more apparent when a
series of defections of key personnel shook
MININT in 1968 and 1969.
The revamping of MININT included both
personnel and structural changes. In July 1968,
the first vice minister of the armed forces, Major
Sergio del Valle Jimenez, replaced Major Ramiro
Valdes Menendez as interior minister. (Valdes,
who had directed the ministry since 1961, was
not in disfavor, however; after completing a
lengthy high-level course of politico-military stud-
ies, he assumed in January 1970 the position that
del Valle had previously vacated.) Major Eddy
Sunol Ricardo, a member of the party’s Central
Committee, who had often been used by Raul
Castro as a trouble shooter, was named to the
newly created post of MININT vice minister for
political work. The first vice minister, Major
8 May 1970
Approved for Release: 2023/03/28 C03154550