Weekly Summary

Approved for Release: 2023/03/28 C03154550
SEGREI ‘>3
CUBA AND SUBVERSION: Oll_D STRATEGY, NEW TACTICS
Fidel Castro has been involved in subversion and armed struggle in varying degrees
ever since the Cayo Confites expedition in 1947. Almost every Latin American Republic
has felt his interference at least once. His involvement has taken many different forms
ranging from direct personal participation, as in the abortive Cayo Confites adventure
against dictator Trujillo in the Dominican Republic, to the supplying of tons of arms
and ammunition, as in Venezuela in 1963. His efforts .have consistently met with failure,
with the single exception of his war against former Cuban president Fulgencio Batista.
Even then it took two attempts before Batista was ousted. Despite his many setbacks, he
has adopted revolution as a way of life, and there are no signs that he plans to reject it as
a basic tenet of his personal philosophy. His tactics might change because of the
circumstances peculiar to a particular situation, but the fundamental precept seems
immutable. '
Castro's predilection for armed struggle as the main road to political power has
brought him into conflict with many of the l\/loscow-oriented Communist parties of
Latin America and even with some orthodox Communists in Cuba. His domestic critics
are too timid and too few to constitute a serious problem; they are handled in typical
Castro steamroller fashion through public denunciation followed by various forms of
banishment. The foreign parties, however, have the ear of the Soviet Union, Cuba's most
important benefactor, and are less easy to silence. Party leaders, many of whom were
well-established disciples of Marx and Lenin long before Castro began dabbling in
politics, view the Cuban dictator as a latecomer to the Communist movement and as an
arrogant, self-appointed oracle of revolutionary doctrine. Castro in turn thinks of them
as ossified theoreticians corrupted by the soft life and blind to political reality. On
occasion, Castro has been willing to accommodate Soviet reaction to complaints from
Latin American party officials by agreeing, as he did in 1963 and 1964, to allow the
local Communist party leaders to determine the road—peaceful or nonpeaceful—to
power in their respective countries. Such agreements, however, have been honored only
for relatively brief periods of time and Castro invariably has returned to cramming his
guerrilla tactics down their throats.
When Castro's most carefully conceived guerrilla venture—Che Guevara's operation
in Bolivia—met disaster in late 1967, party leaders throughout the hemisphere could
scarcely restrain an audible sigh of relief. In their eyes, Castro's theories of violent
revolution had at last been proved wrong. A toning-down of propaganda and a hiatus in
Havana's support of guerrilla warfare operations suggested that Castro had finally
recognized his folly and was adopting a change of strategy. This hope, however, has
proved to be false. Evidence of the past two years shows clearly that Castro clings as
strongly as ever to his theories of armed struggle and violence. His tactics have changed,
but his strategy remains the same. Moreover, armed struggle and violent revolution seem
to be such basic elements in Castro's psychological make-up that they will probably
remain Cuban policy for as long as he is in power. But whatever Casti"o's theories, a
variety of factors will tend to make him selective in his support of revolutionary groups.
Sp6ClEll Report --
1 - 8 May 1970
Approved for Release: 2023/03/28 C03154550