Documents / FOIA release

(EST Pub Date) Science and Technology in Communist CHINA Through 1970

Central Intelligence Agency · 1965-06-01 · 95 pages · text from the file's own layer

This Central Intelligence Agency release is a Scientific Intelligence Study, TCS No. 4425/65. The Scientific Intelligence Committee prepared it with other intelligence community committees and approved it on 3 June 1965. It assesses Communist China's capabilities in science and technology through 1970, with particular attention to military and industrial programs. The study concludes that China will lag far behind advanced nations. The exceptions are a few priority areas such as nuclear weapons, missiles and air defense. It contains no discussion of UFOs.

  • p. 5 …Hence, the Scientific Intelligence Committee has undertaken this study to provide the intelligence com- munity with…
  • p. 10 …China will continue to lag far behind the more advanced nations of the world in the…
  • p. 12 …from the present through 1970, China will remain far behind the world’s more advanced nations…
  • p. 13 …Much good work in analytical chemistry is conducted by the Chinese, particularly on the methods of…
  • p. 14 …The most im- portant advancement in agricultural research has been in crop breeding. New native strains…
  • p. 17 …with advances in products, equipment, and production techniques. In more complex fields—for example, the priority…
  • p. 18 …In a few fields, especially those related to the advanced weapons program, a high priority in…
  • p. 19 …China is now taking steps to establish rela- tions with advanced countries of the non-Commu…
  • p. 20 …levels in the common disciplines of science and to concentrate on advancement in the follow- ing…
  • p. 24 …Research and de- velopment have continued to expand since 1960, especially in the expensive advanced weapons…
  • p. 28 …the last 10 years. Other new leaders will come from more formal programs for advanced training…
  • p. 29 …Sophisti- cated apparatus of the kind expected to be used in the research laboratories of advanced…
  • p. 32 …techniques and methods, and deficiencies in the amounts of advanced mate- rials, equipment, and facilities. Nevertheless…
  • p. 33 …The most advanced high-speed digital com- puter in China, the 16-K, is somewhat inferior…
  • p. 41 …capabilities lower than in advanced countries. Minimum operational requirements of the armed forces, industry, and agriculture…
  • p. 42 …By 1970, China will be only slightly nearer the level of advanced countries in meteorology. 148…
  • p. 45 …the situation during the period of this estimate, but by 1973-75 they should advance the…
  • p. 46 …Considerable advances have been made by the Chinese in the field of antibiotic research, but they…
  • p. 53 …This research, how- ever, has not yet reached the advanced scientific stage of that in many…
  • p. 62 _.-¢a_.- resistant materials imposed by advanced military and civilian requirements, the Chinese increased substantially the electric…
  • p. 66 …oriented toward the development of advanced weaponry and toward the production of advanced weapons on a…
  • p. 67 …The Chinese now are de- pendent on foreign sources for some advanced equipment and for designs…
  • p. 68 …However, advanced tech- nology is not needed to get most of the jobs done. The Chinese…
  • p. 78 …of the Shanghai-class, which do not represent any radical advances in design. The Shanghai-class…
  • p. 86 …These equipments, how- ever, probably will not be as sophisticated as those of the more advanced…
  • p. 87 …coMMUmcA'r1oNs—China places heavy reli- ance on imports from the more advanced countries for its…
Approved for Release: 2018/01/30 C00659420
TCS 4425/as
291. The two organizations that are associated
with all aspects of Chinese ship research, design,
and construction are the Scientific Research Insti-
tute for Shipbuilding, which operates a relatively
small model basin at Shanghai, and the Central
Design and Construction Ofiice for Shipbuilding,
Shanghai, both under the control of the Sixth Min-
istry for Machine Building.
292. In addition, the Chinese have constructed
a probable model basin, 1,600 feet long at Wu-hsi,
about 60 miles northwest of Shanghai. This instal-
lation should become operational sometime in the
period 1965 to 1967. It should enhance China’s
ship designing capabilities considerably by permit-
ting the Chinese to test fast merchant ship and
warship models. '
293. HULL DESIGN AND smp CONSTRUC’I'ION——Th6
Chinese, with Soviet material and technical aid,
were able to build a number of Whiskey- and Riga-
class destroyer escorts of Soviet design. More
recently they completed construction of a Golf-
class ballistic missile submarine and a Romeo-class
submarine, apparently without the aid of Soviet
personnel and quite possibly without Soviet ma-
terials.
294. Although the Chinese lack of suficient num-
ber of qualified personnel for the production of
significant new naval ship designs embodying origi-
nal contributions, they are designing coastal and
river ships of their own by the application of Soviet
technical information. In all marine design work,
they are making every effort to incorporate the
most modern materials.
295. The Chinese have a native design capability
in small naval craft and have already designed
and constructed a number of fast patrol boats of the
Shanghai-class, which do not represent any radical
advances in design. The Shanghai-class pan-ol boat
probably is propelled by Soviet-designed engines,
but the basic hull probably was designed and
developed by the Chinese.
296. ‘SHIP PRoPULsr0N—China’s design and devel-
opment of main propulsion engines for commercial
ships is difficult to distinguish from that devoted
to naval ships. The Chinese have depended heavily
on Soviet technical assistance in this area. Main
propulsion units for Whiskey-class submarines and
Riga-class destroyer escorts probably were obtained
from the Soviet Union. l However, it is believed
that the production of commercial diesel propulsion
units for small ships speeded up in 1962.
297. Capabilities in submarine design and con-
struction exist in the ability to copy or modify exist-
ing Soviet submarine designs of the Whiskey-,
Romeo-, and Golf-class. Capability in original sub-
marine design is unlikely by 1970. Original design
and construction of midget submarines may be em-
phasized; a. capability may already exist in this area.
298. If existing trends continue in diesel and gas
turbine research and development, China likelywill
be able to produce medium-size diesel engines for
marine use and marine gas turbines of 5,000- to
8,000-horsepower output. These engines would‘
provide the Chinese with the hardware necessary
for developing a CODAG unit to be employed in
MTB- or PCE-type surface craft.
299. By 1970, China should be able to design or
copy and construct any of the more sophisticated
steam turbine propulsion plants presently in exist-
ence.
300. There presently are no known indications
of Chinese research in unconventional forms of pro-
pulsion, such as fuel cells. Marine applications of
this mode of propulsion by the Chinese are not
likely to occur by 1970.
V301. Although China is not known to be vigor-
ously pursuing the development of hydrofoils for
military applications,l ‘ , l
l
Capabilities to design
and construct this type of craft for inland waters
and near shore operations should be adequate by
1970.
A
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Approved for Release: 2018/01/30 C00659420
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FOIA release, from the cia-readingroom collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is above. 95 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.