Documents / FOIA release
This Central Intelligence Agency release is a Scientific Intelligence Study, TCS No. 4425/65. The Scientific Intelligence Committee prepared it with other intelligence community committees and approved it on 3 June 1965. It assesses Communist China's capabilities in science and technology through 1970, with particular attention to military and industrial programs. The study concludes that China will lag far behind advanced nations. The exceptions are a few priority areas such as nuclear weapons, missiles and air defense. It contains no discussion of UFOs.
“Mons”2 pages
‘EMF: “LT?” Approved for Release: 2018/01/30 C00659420 - (b)( TCS 4425/as _1Q|: a maximum effective AA range of about 1312 s vehicles of Soviet origin, the majority of which0 are of World War II vinta e Chi , g . na pOSSeSSes a feet. The 85mm weapon, of World War II vintage, ca abili f ' ' ' ' tained rate of fireof 60 rounds per minute and ha and the 100mm AA gun, designed in 1949 utiliz m ofi-carriage fire control equipment. The maximu effective AA range of these weapons is 27,500 fee and 39,000 feet respectively. Although research, development, and deployment of surface-to-air mis siles is increasing, conventional tube artillery is ex p ty or manufacturing in limited quantitiese the Soviet T-54 medium tank and also an artifle prime mover based on an old Soviet design D '1-Y t the forecast period, th Ch‘e mese are not expected to develop any significant combat vehicle of native- design. Moreover, during the period, the Chinese- are not expected to develop any mobility de ' vicespected to continue to be used in an AA role by the 01' 1'n6th0d$ Wh' 11 1 ' ' ' Chinese during the period of this forecast. No newly designed antiaircraft guns are expected to appear in China’s inventory for the next 5 years 286. d. FIELD ARTILLERY wEA1>oNs—The Chinese People’s Liberation Army is equipped with proven weapons which are characterized by simplicity of design, operation, ruggedness, and field maintain- ability. The loss of Soviet teclmical support is expected to have long-range effects on a weapons modernization program. In the past, the Chinese have relied almost entirely on foreign designs while neglecting to develop a research and development capability necessary for continued progress. The Chinese are believed to have recognized this prob- lem; though there is little indication that a vigorous research‘ and development program for improved artillery weapons exists at the present time. 287. During this forecast period, Chinese artil- lery units probably will continue to be equipped with the foreign-designed weapons currently in their inventory. The artillery rocket launchers of 132mm and 140mm probably will be supplemented by a Chinese version of the Soviet-designed 240mm launcher. Current indications of the extensive re- search and development effort in the field of rockets should aid the Chinese to establish a design capac- ity applicable to field artillery-type launchers. A single-round, truck-mounted rocket launcher of the FROG (free flight rocket over ground) type may appear as a prototype, or in limited quantities, thus providing the Chinese with a 10- to 30-mile range weapon having a CW, HE, or eventually a nuclear delivery capability. 288. e. COMBAT vamcmzs-Past efforts on the art of China to develo and roduce tanks, ar- P P P mored personnel carriers, and assault guns have been practically negligible. This is evidenced bythe current Chinese invento f 1c wou d significantly improve the mobility capabilities of current tanks, armored suP_ port weapons, armored personnel _carn'ers and transporters or special purpose armored vehicles. 4. Naval Weapons Systems 289. PRESENT R & n CAPABH-ITIES AND 'mE1~ms_At present, the Chinese possess a minor capability in the design and development of warships and their associated propulsion plants. This capability is based on experience gained as a result of Soviet technical assistance which began about 1954 under an agreement with the USSR to furnish technical help and prefabricated components of naval ves- sels. The Soviets furnished the Chinese with de- tailed information, such as the working drawings of ships under construction, with technical advisors - from the Soviet shipbuilding industry who aided the Chinese in solving design and constxuction problems, and with material aid in the form of prefabricated sections for warships under construc- tion. This Soviet aid was fiunished to the Chinese in the construction of several classes of warships, namely the W-class submarine, the Riga-class destroyer escort, the Kronstadt-class submarine chaser, and possibly to some degree the recently constructed C-class ballistic missile submarine. 290. Concurrently with the start of the Soviet aid program, a department of shipbuilding W68 instituted at Chia-tung University, Shanghai, and a serious effort was initiated to build research facilities and to train technical ersonnel This and is eicpected (b)(1 to strengthen e ese research and develop ment capability as it begins to turn out technically educated and qualified personnel. As a result Of past Soviet technical assistance, the ship design personnel have acquired a limited native design ry 0 armored combat capability. 54 \ (B3253 . Approved for Release: 2018/01/30 C00659420 aw mW§§8%i§a
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FOIA release, from the cia-readingroom collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is above. 95 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.