Documents / FOIA release

(EST Pub Date) Science and Technology in Communist CHINA Through 1970

Central Intelligence Agency · 1965-06-01 · 95 pages · text from the file's own layer

This Central Intelligence Agency release is a Scientific Intelligence Study, TCS No. 4425/65. The Scientific Intelligence Committee prepared it with other intelligence community committees and approved it on 3 June 1965. It assesses Communist China's capabilities in science and technology through 1970, with particular attention to military and industrial programs. The study concludes that China will lag far behind advanced nations. The exceptions are a few priority areas such as nuclear weapons, missiles and air defense. It contains no discussion of UFOs.

  • p. 5 …Hence, the Scientific Intelligence Committee has undertaken this study to provide the intelligence com- munity with…
  • p. 10 …China will continue to lag far behind the more advanced nations of the world in the…
  • p. 12 …from the present through 1970, China will remain far behind the world’s more advanced nations…
  • p. 13 …Much good work in analytical chemistry is conducted by the Chinese, particularly on the methods of…
  • p. 14 …The most im- portant advancement in agricultural research has been in crop breeding. New native strains…
  • p. 17 …with advances in products, equipment, and production techniques. In more complex fields—for example, the priority…
  • p. 18 …In a few fields, especially those related to the advanced weapons program, a high priority in…
  • p. 19 …China is now taking steps to establish rela- tions with advanced countries of the non-Commu…
  • p. 20 …levels in the common disciplines of science and to concentrate on advancement in the follow- ing…
  • p. 24 …Research and de- velopment have continued to expand since 1960, especially in the expensive advanced weapons…
  • p. 28 …the last 10 years. Other new leaders will come from more formal programs for advanced training…
  • p. 29 …Sophisti- cated apparatus of the kind expected to be used in the research laboratories of advanced…
  • p. 32 …techniques and methods, and deficiencies in the amounts of advanced mate- rials, equipment, and facilities. Nevertheless…
  • p. 33 …The most advanced high-speed digital com- puter in China, the 16-K, is somewhat inferior…
  • p. 41 …capabilities lower than in advanced countries. Minimum operational requirements of the armed forces, industry, and agriculture…
  • p. 42 …By 1970, China will be only slightly nearer the level of advanced countries in meteorology. 148…
  • p. 45 …the situation during the period of this estimate, but by 1973-75 they should advance the…
  • p. 46 …Considerable advances have been made by the Chinese in the field of antibiotic research, but they…
  • p. 53 …This research, how- ever, has not yet reached the advanced scientific stage of that in many…
  • p. 62 _.-¢a_.- resistant materials imposed by advanced military and civilian requirements, the Chinese increased substantially the electric…
  • p. 66 …oriented toward the development of advanced weaponry and toward the production of advanced weapons on a…
  • p. 67 …The Chinese now are de- pendent on foreign sources for some advanced equipment and for designs…
  • p. 68 …However, advanced tech- nology is not needed to get most of the jobs done. The Chinese…
  • p. 78 …of the Shanghai-class, which do not represent any radical advances in design. The Shanghai-class…
  • p. 86 …These equipments, how- ever, probably will not be as sophisticated as those of the more advanced…
  • p. 87 …coMMUmcA'r1oNs—China places heavy reli- ance on imports from the more advanced countries for its…
,_‘9.,__...__
_
Approved for Release: 2018/01/30 C00659420
An added indicator is the recent
identification of a new, large, experimental. ship
model testing basin near Wu-hsi, which is nearing
completion.
233. The Chinese have been faced with two
major problems in shipbuilding: (i) the need to
establish production facilities capable of supplying
the full range of marine components, and (ii) the
design and manufacture of complex modern com-
ponents that require advanced theoretical concepts
and/ or manufacturing techniques, particularly for
naval ship construction. The Chinese now are de-
pendent on foreign sources for some advanced
equipment and for designs and will continue to be
so through 1970. However, we anticipate that in-
creasing numbers of ships will be completed an-
nually, probably having increased complexity.
The Chinese have produced destroyer escorts, tor-
pedo boats, minesweepers, submarines, submarine
chasers, and various types of small craft. The
recent appearance of a Komar-class and an Osa-
class guided missile patrol boat suggests the possi-
bility of their serial production before 1970. Pro-
duction of these boats, however, is dependent on
the Chinese development of their missile systems.
It is unlikely that the Chinese will produce their
own native version of either a modem major war-
ship or modern submarine in the period of the
estimate. -
234. Aircraft
1
The Chinese had produced the
resco i -17 jet fighter, the Colt (AN-2) piston
transport, and the Hound (Mi-4) helicopter and
were preparing for production of the Badger
( Tu-16) medium bomber and the
/
dependence on Soviet technical advice or blue-
prints that were removed in 1960, and inability to
maintain standards and tolerances in manufacture.
235. Activity at aircraft plants in late 1964 and
early 1965 suggests that the production of some of
the advanced craft may soon start, including prob-
ably the Farmer and possibly the F ishbed. Short-
ages of special metals and of technological skills
may continue to limit the production of aircraft,
although some gaps can be filled by imports from
the Free World. The production of native models
is not likely to reach significant proportions by
1970 because of backwardness in design, research,
and production.
236. Land Armaments-—China has more than 60
arsenals for the production of land armaments.
This includes plants of pre-1949 vintage, some of
which have been expanded and re-equipped, and
newer ones built with Soviet aid. About seven
plants appear to be related to armored vehicle
production, including a Soviet-aid plant at Pao-tou
that has produced the T-54 tank. Activity at the
arsenals was at a modest level during 1960-63,
because of general shortages of raw materials, the
general economic dislocation, and the lack of
skilled personnel to replace the Soviet advisors and
technicians withdrawn in mid-1960. Some of the
plants that were built in the late 1950’s may not
have been fully equipped with production ma-
chinery and ancillary equipment before the Soviet
withdrawal. -
237. China probably can supply small arms and
small-caliber crew weapons in suflicient quantities
to meet the requirements of the ground forces
through the 1970 period. Present facilities prob-
ably could not meet all requirements for large-
caliber weapons, tanks, armored cars, and other
vehicles by 1970, but modernization and re-equip-
ping of the ground forces is not urgently required
barring full-scale war.
4. Light Industry
238. Most light industrial plants in China, are
characterized by techniques that are within Chinese
capabilities. China’s textile, food processing, and
paper plants are operating below capacity at pres-
ent, largely because of insufiicient raw materials.
A
47
Approved for Release: 2018/01/30 C00659420

Not linked to a story yet.

About this file

FOIA release, from the cia-readingroom collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is above. 95 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.