Documents / FOIA release

(EST Pub Date) Science and Technology in Communist CHINA Through 1970

Central Intelligence Agency · 1965-06-01 · 95 pages · text from the file's own layer

This Central Intelligence Agency release is a Scientific Intelligence Study, TCS No. 4425/65. The Scientific Intelligence Committee prepared it with other intelligence community committees and approved it on 3 June 1965. It assesses Communist China's capabilities in science and technology through 1970, with particular attention to military and industrial programs. The study concludes that China will lag far behind advanced nations. The exceptions are a few priority areas such as nuclear weapons, missiles and air defense. It contains no discussion of UFOs.

  • p. 37 …Technological problems concerning the beneficiation of ores for the production of the com- mon nonferrous metals…
  • p. 68 …themselves state that, of the 300,000 mon-carrier network by using integrated multiple) miles of…
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Approved for Release: 2018/01/30 C00659420
An added indicator is the recent
identification of a new, large, experimental. ship
model testing basin near Wu-hsi, which is nearing
completion.
233. The Chinese have been faced with two
major problems in shipbuilding: (i) the need to
establish production facilities capable of supplying
the full range of marine components, and (ii) the
design and manufacture of complex modern com-
ponents that require advanced theoretical concepts
and/ or manufacturing techniques, particularly for
naval ship construction. The Chinese now are de-
pendent on foreign sources for some advanced
equipment and for designs and will continue to be
so through 1970. However, we anticipate that in-
creasing numbers of ships will be completed an-
nually, probably having increased complexity.
The Chinese have produced destroyer escorts, tor-
pedo boats, minesweepers, submarines, submarine
chasers, and various types of small craft. The
recent appearance of a Komar-class and an Osa-
class guided missile patrol boat suggests the possi-
bility of their serial production before 1970. Pro-
duction of these boats, however, is dependent on
the Chinese development of their missile systems.
It is unlikely that the Chinese will produce their
own native version of either a modem major war-
ship or modern submarine in the period of the
estimate. -
234. Aircraft
1
The Chinese had produced the
resco i -17 jet fighter, the Colt (AN-2) piston
transport, and the Hound (Mi-4) helicopter and
were preparing for production of the Badger
( Tu-16) medium bomber and the
/
dependence on Soviet technical advice or blue-
prints that were removed in 1960, and inability to
maintain standards and tolerances in manufacture.
235. Activity at aircraft plants in late 1964 and
early 1965 suggests that the production of some of
the advanced craft may soon start, including prob-
ably the Farmer and possibly the F ishbed. Short-
ages of special metals and of technological skills
may continue to limit the production of aircraft,
although some gaps can be filled by imports from
the Free World. The production of native models
is not likely to reach significant proportions by
1970 because of backwardness in design, research,
and production.
236. Land Armaments-—China has more than 60
arsenals for the production of land armaments.
This includes plants of pre-1949 vintage, some of
which have been expanded and re-equipped, and
newer ones built with Soviet aid. About seven
plants appear to be related to armored vehicle
production, including a Soviet-aid plant at Pao-tou
that has produced the T-54 tank. Activity at the
arsenals was at a modest level during 1960-63,
because of general shortages of raw materials, the
general economic dislocation, and the lack of
skilled personnel to replace the Soviet advisors and
technicians withdrawn in mid-1960. Some of the
plants that were built in the late 1950’s may not
have been fully equipped with production ma-
chinery and ancillary equipment before the Soviet
withdrawal. -
237. China probably can supply small arms and
small-caliber crew weapons in suflicient quantities
to meet the requirements of the ground forces
through the 1970 period. Present facilities prob-
ably could not meet all requirements for large-
caliber weapons, tanks, armored cars, and other
vehicles by 1970, but modernization and re-equip-
ping of the ground forces is not urgently required
barring full-scale war.
4. Light Industry
238. Most light industrial plants in China, are
characterized by techniques that are within Chinese
capabilities. China’s textile, food processing, and
paper plants are operating below capacity at pres-
ent, largely because of insufiicient raw materials.
A
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Approved for Release: 2018/01/30 C00659420

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FOIA release, from the cia-readingroom collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is above. 95 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.