(EST Pub Date) Science and Technology in Communist CHINA Through 1970

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rcs 4425/65 (W3)
ble of employing about some 200,000 persons,
features the production of military equipment.
Civilian production is limited to priority require-
ments of industry and government, such as com-
munications equipment needed to spread propa-
ganda to the populace and overseas.
228. d. MILITARY MACHINERY AND EQUIPMENT-
GeneraL—The level of technology in Chinese plants
producing military hardware has been raised only
slightly since 1960. Progress has been confined
largely to development and production facilities
in the nuclear and missile fields. The present
state of military production technology is as follows:
i. Continuation of a basic orientation toward the
production of ground armaments.
ii. A lack of mass-production-type technology and
little use of automation.
iii. An incompleted aircraft industry lacking some
key units of production equipment and possessing only
a small production and technical capability for ad-
vanced aircraft.
iv. A very small capability for the producfion of
high-precision components for the control and instru-
mentation of advanced military systems.
v. A shortage of designers and production engineers
competent to set up serial production of components
for new weapons systems.
vi. A naval shipbuilding industry with a capability
for a small annual output of attack submarines, de-
stroyers, and patrol craft but lacking adequate capa-
bility for serial production of some key components
and lacking ability to design indigenous production
models.
229. Advanced Weapons—Growing access to
Free World production equipment and technology,
as well as domestic programs in scientific and
engineering education, may permit by 1970 the
improvement of military production technology
on a broader base; but energies still will be strongly
oriented toward the development of advanced
weaponry and toward the production of advanced
weapons on a small serial basis. By 1970, China
will have only a small capability to produce rela-
tively advanced weapons, assuming that it has
access to foreign equipment and technology with-
out any marked improvement. Imports of pre-
cision machine tools from such countries as Czecho-
slovakia and Switzerland have increased since 1960,
and japan is likely to become a more important
supplier than in the past.
(h\(’%\
46
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(W3)
230. Present Chinese production technology is
capable of providing missile components in the
small quantities required to support present re,
search and developmen\ programs for ballistic mi$_
siles of medium range. However, there are esti_
mated deficiencies in the capability to support
production of certain elements of missile systems.
The Chinese probably will attain a limited pro-
duction capability for an MRBM system by 1967
or 1968. The Chinese may be producing some
kind of SAM, either replacements for the SA-2 or
prototypes of a native Chinese version, or both.
The evidence is not suflicient to permit .a firm
judgment, but it is considered highly unlikely
that either version is being produced on a sub-
stantial scale. It may be 2 or 3 years before
larger scale production is within their capability.
Foreign technical assistance may be a primary
factor in future development of the Chinese missile
programs, depending on the types of missiles
selected for production and the scale of the planned
deployment efforts. The availability of Free World
scientific and technical literature l
K
have aided China's SAM development. (b)
(b)(
Approved for Release: 2018/01/30 C00659420
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Approved for Release: 2018/01/30 C00659420
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