Documents / FOIA release
This Central Intelligence Agency release is a Scientific Intelligence Study, TCS No. 4425/65. The Scientific Intelligence Committee prepared it with other intelligence community committees and approved it on 3 June 1965. It assesses Communist China's capabilities in science and technology through 1970, with particular attention to military and industrial programs. The study concludes that China will lag far behind advanced nations. The exceptions are a few priority areas such as nuclear weapons, missiles and air defense. It contains no discussion of UFOs.
Approved for Release: 2018/01/30 - e “F6?-5'E€-R-E'F TCS 4425/as target areas to defend against reconnaissance over- flights by high-altitude aircraft. 36. Space activities in China appear to be limited at this time. Success with the MRBM program could eventually provide a capability to orbit a small satellite using relatively simple upper stages. Also, if the Chinese efforts to purchase foreign missile equipment and technology are successful, a program to demonstrate a space capability could get underway any time before 1970. 37. Aeronautical research, development, and pro- duction are quite limited generally. An abrupt cessation of programs, based on Soviet applied designs and blueprints,‘ was noted in mid-1960, and only recently have we seen signs of a resumption of activity. Although the Chinese probably can produce copies of Soviet MiG-21 aircraft by 1965-66, and the Badger and Camel by 1968, they probably cannot design and build a significant military aircraft of their own until the 1970's. Materials research has met with some success, but high Western standards are still well beyond the reach of the Chinese. Spare engines are purchased abroa for Il-18’s and Viscounts Increases in facto floorspace indicate a Chinese intention to produg; aircraft and engines on a much larger scale. Soviet aid was withdrawn in 1960, and no appreciable numbers of combat aircraft have been produced since the MiG-17 and -19 programs folded after the rift. The Badger and/ or Camel programs have not yet gotten underway. China has an urgent need for military aircraft, but the USSR at least has curtailed the supply of spare parts and has withheld essential elements of support for both the Badger and MiC—21 production programs. 38. Chinese ground weapons developments cur- rently stress a rapid build-up of improved weapons based on foreign designs. They are either modi- fied slightly or copied exactly and are produced in large volume. Emphasis is placed on the repro- duction of infantry weapons, antiaircraft artillery, field artillery weapons, and combat vehicles. In- digenous conventional armaments research and de- velopment probably will not have developed suffi- ciently to change this situation much b 1970, aly - though experience will eventually allow much more independence. 39. At present, the Chinese possess a small but improving capability in the design and develop- ment of minor warships and their associated pro- pulsion plants. The capability in ship design should be improved considerably by the construc- tion of a model basin about 75 miles northwest of Shanghai. This in- stallation should become operational in the period 1965 to 1967. The Chinese probably will not at- tain a capability in the design and development of major warships and submarines until beyond the period of this estimate. . 40. Antisubmarine warfare research and devel- opment efforts appear to be in their infancy. 41. Defensive, rather than offensive, chemical warfare doctrine is emphasized in China. Much of the CW material is made from Soviet designs furnished by the USSR / Chemical personnel receive highly spe cialized training in all aspects of chemical warfare. China’s offensive CW capability is impaired by limited production of agents and stockpiling capa- bilities. Available ground weapons and Soviet- designed aircraft are capable of disseminating massive quantities of CW agents in a large-scale offensive tactical operation. On the other hand, China within the next 5 years will not produce adequate amounts of either offensive or defensive CW material to rise above training requirements plus a small amount for stockpiling. The Chinese Peoples Liberation Army (CPLA) has an excellent screening-smoke capability and a small but grow- ing flame warfare Civihan de- fensive CW equipment apparently is almost com- pletely lacking. 42. The Chinese are not known to be actively engaged in the research and development of bio- logical warfare agents at this A 7 “Approved for Release: 2018/01/30 C00659420
Not linked to a story yet.
FOIA release, from the cia-readingroom collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is above. 95 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.