Documents / FOIA release

Intelligence and Security Operations of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam Ministry of National Defense

Central Intelligence Agency · 1979-12-01 · 120 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is a December 1979 Central Intelligence Agency study published by the Directorate of Operations Counterintelligence Staff. It describes the Enemy Proselytizing Department (Cuc Dich Van) of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam Ministry of National Defense. The study traces the department's origins from 1941 through the French and Vietnam wars. It covers psychological warfare, fifth column penetration of ARVN and allied forces, the handling of US and allied prisoners of war, and the postwar reeducation of former ARVN personnel. It contains no material on UFOs.

  • p. 74 …personnel; and the Thanh Ong Nam (Hoc Mon District) Camp had over 5,000 officers interned…
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Prison Comp Life; Mail and Visiting Priviledges
Those who remained under imprisonment in reeducation camps were
abruptly made aware of the fact that they had been classified as prisoners of
war (tu binh). Camp life was grim. Manual labor was the principal daily
activity of each internee and took up virtually all daylight hours. It consisted
of cleaning the camp, preparing meals, weeding gardens, raising vegetables,
manufacturing articles from wood, cutting wood, building huts, filling bomb
craters, etc. Political indoctrination courses were conducted after the evening
meal and lasted from 1900 hours to about 2200 hours. After that time, selected
internees were subject_ed to late-night interrogations by PAVN CDV, military
security, and various service branch interrogators. The objective of the camp
life routine was to keep the internees physically exhausted and docile. Those
prisoners considered to be “dangerous,” that is, incorrigible and unresponsive,
by camp authorities were given the most difficult and hazardous tasks, such as
filling bomb craters, cutting large trees, clearing minefields, and removing
unexploded bombs or artillery shells.“ Those who, in the view of -the camp
authorities, had not worked seriously were given “compensatory” work at
night, which further aggravated their weakened physical condition. Food in
the camps was marginal. The standard food ration was one or two bowls (500
grams) of rice, and some local vegetables raised by the internees. Small
amounts of fish and, rarely, meat were occasionally available. Medical care
was virtually nonexistent. ‘No medicines were available. Only the very
seriously ill were occasionally sent to medical facilities for treatment. Most
internees suffered from serious malnutrition, and varying stages of beriberi,
dysentery, malaria, and other diseases.
At first, none of the internees were given mail privileges. Authorities
forbade family visits with the internees. For several months, family members
did not know where the internee was or even if he was still alive as rumors of
executions began to circulate. Beginning in December 1975, the camp
authorities permitted certain internees who had shown progress in reeducation
to write to their families. In their letters, the internees were only permitted to
relate personal news and to provide the letter box number of the intermediate
post office in I-Io Chi Minh City. After five or more exchanges of letters and
the sending of food packages, family members could address a request to the
camp commander for permission to visit their relatives. Permission was
granted only if the internee had continued to demonstrate “good results" to
the camp authorities. The camp commander's decision was final and could not
be appealed. If the visitation request was approved, the authorities informed
the family of the camp location and issued a pass authorizing the visit and
travel involved. Upon arrival at the camp, the visitors were not allowed to
approach or speak directly with the interned relative. Family meetings usually
took place in large open areas where the visitor and the internee remained
about 100 meters apart but close enough to permit visual recognition. Written
notes could be exchanged through camp guards at the site. All written notes
were reviewed and censored on the spot.
Treatment of VNAF Personnel; the PAVN Air Force Experiment
Until March 1976, former Vietnamese Air Force (VNAF) personnel were
givenpreferential treatment. At first, Hanoi had no standard policy towards
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FOIA release, from the cia-readingroom collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is above. 120 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.