Documents / FOIA release

Intelligence and Security Operations of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam Ministry of National Defense

Central Intelligence Agency · 1979-12-01 · 120 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is a December 1979 Central Intelligence Agency study published by the Directorate of Operations Counterintelligence Staff. It describes the Enemy Proselytizing Department (Cuc Dich Van) of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam Ministry of National Defense. The study traces the department's origins from 1941 through the French and Vietnam wars. It covers psychological warfare, fifth column penetration of ARVN and allied forces, the handling of US and allied prisoners of war, and the postwar reeducation of former ARVN personnel. It contains no material on UFOs.

  • p. 7 …supervising the activities of military POWs who cooperated with Hanoi in the preparation of psychological warfare…
  • p. 16 …POWs, ARVN as well as US, who cooperated with their captors. The’ CDV exploitation of POWs…
  • p. 22 …Those considered to have the same potential but whorefused to cooperate. ~ Category C: Those whose continued…
  • p. 23 …other techniques used to coerce them to cooperate. After a POW was initially categorized, CDV and…
  • p. 24 …Interrogations were aimed at gaining the complete cooperation of a POW for use in antiwar propaganda…
  • p. 25 …preparation of handwritten POW statements from selected cooperative and "progressive" POWs; and supervised “progressive” POWs who…
  • p. 41 …to join the revolution and not to cooperate with the Royal Lao Government. The section also…
  • p. 52 …and investigation of released ARVNi POWs who cooperated with the MSS. The ARVN MSS estimate did…
  • p. 54 …The national police were special targets for recruitment because of the cooperation they offered in processing…
  • p. 67 …in size) on short rations until they cooperated with their indoctrinators/interrogators. It soon became apparent…
  • p. 68 …over arms depots intact, and who had cooperated with the liberation armed forces. Several hundred Category…
  • p. 94 …who had been appointed Prime Minister, to cooperate with the revolution in establishing a coalition government…
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regime. ARVN internees were classified into three basic categories: A, B, and
C. Category A internees were those who had helped to liberate the country,
and included previously-recruited fifth column agent assets and a few field
grade and general staff officers who actively assisted in locating minefields,
turned over arms depots intact, and who had cooperated with the liberation
armed forces. Several hundred Category A officers were assigned to positions
under surveillance in the PAVN, air force, and navy. Category B internees
were those who were reeducated, had admitted their crimes, had sincerely
repented in theeyes of the CDV, had their civil rights restored, and had been
assisted by the new regime in finding employment under close supervision and
surveillance. Most reeducated Category B internees _were junior-ranking
company grade officers and civil servants. Category C internees were those
who had yet to be reeducated since “their hands were stained with blood.”-~
Category C individuals were described by CDV officers as embittered,
sullen, antinational, anti-Communist elements who had not yet rid themselves
of such views. Most captains and field grade officers from the rank of major
upward were classified as Category C: "cruel," "dangerous," and “stubborn”
(ngoan co) elements. Others who were automatically classified as Category C
“dangerous” elements included former airborne, artillery, armor, marine,
ranger, special forces, military intelligence, military police, military security,
political warfare, reconnaissance, rural pacification, and Phoenix personnel,
and air force pilots. Among them were many military officers who had been
detailed to the RVN National Police Command and to the RVN Central
Intelligence Organization, and who had initially.reported themselves for
reeducation as pure military officers with no intelligence or security service
affiliation. Their intelligence and security service affiliations were soon
detected as almost all ARVN I-2, I-5 (Political Warfare), J-7 (SICINT),
Military Security Service, National Police Command, and Central Intelligence
Organization files were left intact for-the new regime to exploit and to cross-
check personal history statements.
For example, although ARVN I-2 Unit 101 administrative and personnel
records were reportedly destroyedin mid-April 1975, operational records
were left intact for the new regime along with the vast bulk of ARVN I-2
administrative, personnel, and operational files and records. All Unit 101
officers and enlisted personnel were immediately sent away to reeducation,
where nearly all were classified as Category C internees. Unit 101
Commander Lieutenant Colonel Le Dinh Luan and his deputy Lieutenant
Colonel Truong Van Ty were subsequently sent to North Vietnam for
exploitation. Other senior ranking ARVN I-2 and Military Security Service
officers suffered a similar fate. All Category C internees were required to
complete a minimum of three years’ education. Only a few low-ranking
ARVN J-2, I-5, J-7, and Military Security Service personnel were released as of
early 1977. By early 1977, the vast majority of Category C internees had been
transferred to permanent camps administered by the CDV in North Vietnam.
Only a few engineers, agronomists, doctors, and other technical specialists,
whose skills were urgently required by the new regime, were released on
probation to the trust of state enterprises and the PAVN.
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FOIA release, from the cia-readingroom collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is above. 120 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.