Intelligence and Security Operations of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam Ministry of National Defense

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statements, with the hope of early release. Those who refused to denounce
others or to admit their own crimes or who were uncooperative during
interrogation were categorized as "stubborn" (ngoan co) elements. “Stubborn”
elements were frequently beaten and placed for periods of up to three weeks
of solitary confinement in sealed metal conex containers (6'x4'x6' in size) on
short rations until they cooperated with their indoctrinators/interrogators.
It soon became apparent to officer internees that early release depended
on telling the same story each time during interrogation. The slightest
deviation from answers given previously to a camp staff cadre meant further
interrogation and extended terms of imprisonment.
Immediately after reporting for reeducation, each internee was required
to fill out a detailed personal history questionnaire before being interviewed.
Initial interviews were conducted by a CDV specialist on the internee’s family
background, service record, and past connections with American officials in
and outside Vietnam. Special attention was given to those who had any
connections with US intelligence, particularly with US CIA officials. Each
internee was interrogated individually on this subject by PAVN military
security officers, who believed that they were knowledgeable of US
intelligence staybehind (nam vung) assets in Vietnam. The internees were also
similarly interrogated for connections with British and French intelligence,
and were subjected to detailed reviews of ARVN strategy and tactics with
heavy emphasis on'small-unit operations.Interrogations initially focused on
the personal involvement of the internees in the war with such typical
questions asked as to how many PAVN personnel they had killed and how
many civilian homes had been destroyed by forces under their comman_d.“The
objective of which was to obtain confessions of “war crimes." Specialists from
various PAVN service branches later interrogated them on sophisticated US
weapons systems, such as aircraft, armored vehicles, radar installations, naval
vessels, artillery, etc. In addition to learning how these systems operated, the
interrogators were also interested in the type of training officers received and
in the installations where the training was conducted. Those trained in the US
appeared to be of most interest to the interrogators, and were subjected to
more lengthy interrogations than other ARVN officer personnel. The internees
were repeatedly told that their sentences would be reduced if they provided
full, accurate information. Field grade and general staff officers were
subjected to late evening interrogation sessions by PAVN military intelligence
and military security officers in camps in South Vietnam and later in North
Vietnam. The interrogators were obviously carefully prepared for their
interrogation sessions, during which they revealed an intimate knowledge of
RVN and ARVN files and records. Captured RVN and ARVN intelligence and
security service files were extensively used to verify information provided; to
identify those with past connections with US, British and -French intelligence;
and to spot, locate, and arrest other knowledgeable officers who attempted to
evade compulsory reeducation. The latter, upon arrest, were subjected to the
same screening and interrogation process.
Categorization of lnternees for Imprisonment and Release
Later, each internee file was reviewed by CDV specialists, who classified
each internee according to the danger he was believed to represent to the new
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