Intelligence and Security Operations of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam Ministry of National Defense

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By I une 1970, military proselytizing successes in the Mekong Delta area of
ARVN IV Corps prompted the ARVN MSS to initiate programs to improve
and consolidate the» security of the RF/ PF forces_ to resist military
proselytizing penetration attempts. ARVN IV_ Corps had over 4,000 RF /PF
outposts and 200,000 RF/PF personnel. RF/PF personnel were generally
recruited without basic background security checks. In June 1970, the ARVN
Joint General Staff approved the establishment of 249 MSS detachments with
a total strength of 1,890 personnel. By March 1971, 246 MSS detachments
were operating with a total of only 629 personnel (70 percent understrength);
718 new MSS recruits were in the process of receiving security clearances.
Despite being understrength, the ARVN IV Corps MSS with 93 detachments
and 243 out of 730 authorized personnel was able to neutralize 142 military
proselytizing cases in the RF/PF, arresting 511 military proselytizing cadres
and 256 RF/PF personnel. 9- ‘_
The ARVN MSS arrests and indoctrination sessions did little to halt the
systematic penetration of ARVN by the CDV forward commands in South
Vietnam. Cadres and agents were able to infiltrate RVN agencies, ARVN, and
the paramilitary RF/ PF, PSDF, PRU, and RD with relative ease..Cadres and
agents acquired legal papers and joined ARVN by either enlisting or
permitting themselves to be drafted, or by falsely defecting to "the RVNthrough the open arms (chieu hoi) program. Several thousand false defectors
were dispatched. False defectors found it particularly easy to infiltrate ARVN,
since, in December 1969, RVN President Nguyen Van Thieu ordered the
drafting of all physically qualified “ex-Viet Cong" not in prison. By Ianuary
1970, over 800 false defectors were dispatched in Binh Dinh Province alone in
Central Vietnam; 27 in Can Tho Province; 50 in Bien Hoa Province; and 25 to
the ARVN 25th Infantry Division. .
'
Other selected cadres were provided with forged documentation" which
was used to gain entry into or exit from ARVN. Document forgery technical-
elements were provided with hundreds of genuine blank civilian identification
cards, ARVN discharge papers, travel mission orders, national police
identification cards, seals, and a host of lessor document forms._The laxity of
the RVN/ARVN identification card system abetted attempts to obtain or forge
legal documentation. The rigid RVN/ARVN procedures that governed the
reporting of lost identification cards were seldom followed. Official RVNstatistics show that 1.7 million new identification cards were issued between
October 1968 and April 1969. Of the thousands of new cards that were stolen
or destroyed during that period, only 13 were reported lost. The
ineffectiveness of the new identification card system was illustrated by a
report dated October 1969 which indicated that in the previous 12 months
only "35 known or suspected Communists" had been detected as a result of
the new cards. -
Other attempts to counter military proselytizing efforts were further"
hampered by the penetration of the RVN/ARVN security and counterintelli-
gence apparatus. These penetrations hampered the arrest of military
proselytizing agents by providing them with advance warnings of impending
security actions, by misdirecting investigations, by falsifying or destroying
records, and by performing other acts of administrative sabotage.
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