Intelligence and Security Operations of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam Ministry of National Defense

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Fifth column assets were also used to collect intelligence for use by MPS
agent recruiters. Intelligence included biographic data on unit members,
information on troop morale, and unit plans and operations. Although the
collection of intelligence was a secondary function, the pervasiveness of MPS
agent operations enabled the Communists to target specifioindividuals and
groups by giving extensive insights into all manner of ARVN activities.
A review of captured documents and reports provide numerous instances
of MPS agents supplying the SVNLA with stolen munitions and equipment.
Although a few reports described moderately sizable thefts, most were small
scale. The MPS was but one source of leakage from ARVN stores.
Fifth column assets were most successful in‘inducing desertions and
defections to the SVNLA through psychological warfare means. ‘They
capitalized on legitimate complaints of low pay, poor living conditions,
excessive discipline, short leaves, and transfers away from native areas of birth
and livelihood. Agitation was laced with traditional themes of anti-
Americanism and allegations that ARVN was but a US puppet tool. Highest
priority targets appeared to be new recruit training depots for ARVN.
Captured documents cited several such depots as heavily penetrated. The MPS
gave their recruiters considerable credit for the high ARVN desertion rate. A
COSVN MPS report claimed credit for 32,534 desertions in the first half of
1969. This figure was about half the 60,851 deserters carried in ARVN
statistics for the same period. The only known ARVN estimate of desertions
caused by the Communists was made in March 1969. In this report to RVN
President Nguyen Van Thieu, ARVN estimated that 25 percent of all ARVN
desertions was inspired by‘ the MPS. This conservative estimate was valid
through the Communist takeover of South Vietnam in April 1975.
Fifth column agents were particularly active in setting up local
accommodation agreements whereby ARVN miliary units refrained from
actively participating in combat actions against SVNLA forces. These
understandings sometimes delineated territory to be controlled, sometimes
restricted certain types of combat actions, and occasionally called for advance
warning of ARVN military operations. According to a captured document
which described such actions in ARVN III Corps, the SVNLA permitted an
RF garrison to leave its post only on the condition that it did not carry any
weapons. This was later amended to allow the RF garrison to carry weapons
and to shoot them in areas prescribed by the SVNLA. Another unit which gave
the SVNLA a fairly large amount of ammunition stayed in its post and obeyed
the stipulated conditions. When the unit was replaced, it passed the stipulated
conditions on to its replacement unit. Another PF unit allowed a Communist
psychological warfare entertainment group to perform at the textile plant
which the PF unit guarded. Other agreements proposed that ARVN/RF/PF
units refrain from "sending personnel out'lon patrols, from drafting youths,
from organizing agent networks, and from requesting artillery or air support at
night. In return, the SVNLA promised not to attack the units if they complied
with the agreed upon inaction. Individual instances of ARVN, RF/PF
accommodation with the enemy were not made with the approval of higher
ARVN, RF/ PF echelons.
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