Documents / FOIA release

Intelligence and Security Operations of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam Ministry of National Defense

Central Intelligence Agency · 1979-12-01 · 120 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is a December 1979 Central Intelligence Agency study published by the Directorate of Operations Counterintelligence Staff. It describes the Enemy Proselytizing Department (Cuc Dich Van) of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam Ministry of National Defense. The study traces the department's origins from 1941 through the French and Vietnam wars. It covers psychological warfare, fifth column penetration of ARVN and allied forces, the handling of US and allied prisoners of war, and the postwar reeducation of former ARVN personnel. It contains no material on UFOs.

  • p. 13 …MPS components in South Vietnam '-,_- |. ._ ' w__ere tasked with the mission of undermining the power base…
  • p. 29 …15 personnel plus 200 others assigned to six detention camps under its control. The Policy Section…
  • p. 38 …Thus, the CDV was indirectly assisted in its mission ofinducing US military desertions and in fomenting…
  • p. 45 …missions: 1. Destruction of the accelerated pacification program, the assassination of "tyrants," the seizure of control…
  • p. 54 ____ P Y -SEGR-E-T— ‘ . - 1a special 15-man penetration cum (unit) with the mission of…
  • p. 62 …He had the mission of inducing Montagnard tribesmen to resist RVN control efforts in the five…
  • p. 82 …Committee, member of the Central Committee's Control Committee Secretariat, and as a deputy secretary of…
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ing new agents, and setting up accommodations whereby local ARVN unitsrefrained from actively participating in the war. The military proselytors'most ambitious goal was to spark revolts, i.e., mutiny, in ARVN units, whichwere referred to in Communist military proselytizing terminology as"uprisings." A COSVN MPS document reported 284 such uprisings in the firstsix months of 1969, and cited several instances in which ARVN units refusedto participate in sweep operations or act as reinforcements. Cases were cited inwhich ARVN soldiers beat up or killed their officers, and in which ARVNmilitary trainees refused to carry out military exercises. The most spectacularexample of_an inside rebellion which the ARVN tried to conceal occurrednorth of Saigon in March 1966 when a group of ARVN soldiers deserted withsix tanks. The dissident soldiers shot up the ARVN compound and headed forCommunist held territory. Allied air strikes were called in, and all but onetank was destroyed. The surviving tank was used later by the S_\_/NLA as atraining aid. ARVN in succeeding years repeatedly covered up all suchincidents as being an internal Vietnamese affair. -
Another COSVN MPS document reported 151 instances of militaryproselytizing agents aiding SVNLA attacks in the first half of 1969, whichresulted in the SVNLA destruction of a number of outposts, warehouses, andvehicles. In August 1969, an ARVN officer in charge of a platoon of 105-mmhowitzers in Vinh Binh Province secured the small arms of his soldiers andthen permitted SVNLA forces to enter his compound. Most platoon memberswere killed, and SVNLA forces used the howitzers to fire on the provincialcapital. The incident was covered up by ARVN, which mentioned neither theofficer nor his treasonous action to US officials. This type of action increaseddramatically during 1974 when SVNLA forces overran hundreds of ARVNand RF/PF outposts in the Mekong Delta and other areas of the country.Similar actions occurred during PAVN's 1975 general "offensive which seizedSouth Vietnam.
Other captured documents and reports cited numerous cases of sabotagecommitted by military proselytizing agents. For example, between August1968 and March I969, the MPS of the Danang Second District PartyCommittee engaged in 34 acts of sabotage, which resulted in the destruction ofa fuel depot, a tank, a truck, four jeeps, a helicopter, a reconnaissance aircraft,and two howitzers. Other sabotage included the destruction of records, themisrouting of orders, and general misadministration of unit affairs.
Selected acts of assassination were used to cause terror and disruption ofRVN civilian and military agencies. A captured document of March 1967stated that a fifth columnist, who served as the chief of a security element in a_district in Chau Doc Province, assassinated his district chief and misdirectedthe blame for the killing on the deputydistrict chief who was later arrested forthe act. In another case, three enlisted men of the ARVN 7th Infantry Divisionin the Mekong Delta killed their commanding officer, wounded several otherunit members, and then defected to the SVNLA in early 1968. Subsequentinvestigation of the incident resulted in the arrest of 20 additional ARVN fifthcolumnist assets in the ARVN 7th Division.
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FOIA release, from the cia-readingroom collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is above. 120 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.