Intelligence and Security Operations of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam Ministry of National Defense

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Military Region were coordinated with the BCA Region 5 Party Committee's
Security Office, the Military Region 5 Political Staff's Military Security Office,
the BCA Tri-Thien-Hue Region Party Committee's Security Section, and with
the Tri-Thien-Hue Military Region Political Staff's Military Security Section.
According to a captured document, the CDV forward military
proselytizing commands in South Vietnam had six primary missions:
1. Destruction of the accelerated pacification program, the assassination
of "tyrants," the seizure of control over the populace, and the
motivation of the masses to seize control of rural areas.
2. Development of revolutionary forces in enemy units to undermine
enemy combat potential, and to eliminate oppressive forces, tyrants,
and pacification cadre.
3. Kindling of an all-out political strugglein ARVN units in conjunction
with an all-out uprising of the people.
4. Conduct of three-pronged attacks (military, political and military
proselytizing) to resist the enemy plan to relocate the populace and his
Chieu Hoi (Open Arms) defector activities.
5. Promotion of the antiwar movement and the urging of US and satellite
troops to refuse to participate in operations and to demand prompt
return home. "
6. Recruitment of agents to penetrate RVN organizations, some of whom_,_:;.._ - .3-If. ,
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to remain dormant until the coalition government is established.
Two types of penetration agents were recruited: tactical and strategic. A
tactical penetration agent was usually recruited in local RF /PF, PSDF, PRU,
and RD units as fifth column assets to support PAVN/SVNLA attacks against
ARVN. These types of agents played a key role in the 1974 PAVN/SVNLA
offensive in the Mekong Delta area, where over 2,800 outposts and 600
hamlets were seized and put under SVNLA control. A strategic penetration
agent is one who served in an important ARVN unit, a critical warehouse,
depot or general reserve force, where he was in a position to collect
intelligence on ARVN strengths, table of organization (T/O), armament,
intentions, and plans, and to recruit other ARVN personnel. The strategic
agent had the potential to hold more important positions, in order to arouse
dissension among other ARVN personnel, to support PAVN/SVNLA forces
during a general offensive, and to serve as an accommodation link between
PAVN/SVNLA and ARVN or with the RF/PF. ARVN junior grade officer
penetrations of aspirant to first lieutenant rank in an ARVN provincial-level
position were approved by the provincial party committee with the
concurrence of its security section. Recruitments of ARVN officers of captain
rank and higher were approved by the region or COSVN MPS with the
concurrence of their security sections. Officer penetrations were rarely used to
spot, assess, develop, and to approach other fellow officers for recruitment.
The mission of fifth columnists included fomenting unit revolts, aiding
Communist attacks, performing acts of sabotage and assassination, collecting
intelligence, stealing munitions, promoting desertions and defections, recruit-
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