Intelligence and Security Operations of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam Ministry of National Defense

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Research (Military Intelligence) Department (CNC) and PAVN 305th Special
Operations High Command staff officers. Interrogations were conducted at
one of three detention facilities maintained by the section in the SLMR. The
exploitation of defectors and POWs included the recruitment, training and
dispatch of double agents, usually released Royal Lao POWs who were hardly
ever detained for more than a year, and the preparation of psychological
warfare pamphlets, leaflets, radio broadcasts, and personal antiwar letters to
relatives and friends in the Royal Lao Armed Forces (FAR). All were designed
to reduce the combat effectiveness of FAR. Most were prepared by the SLMR
Enemy Military Proselytizing Section headquarters, although subordinate
provincial political staff enemy military proselytizing subsections also had the
same capability and worked closely with provincial force unit armed
propaganda teams in distributing the materials. Tape recorded antiwar
appeals were prepared by the SLMR Enemy Military Proselytizing Section for
broadcast over the Lao People's Revolutionary Party Propaganda Training
Section's radio station in Sam Nua. Psychological warfare themes exploited the
Laotian people’s antiwar sentimentsjcondemned the US and the rightwing
forces in Laos for bringing the war to Laos; and appealed to the Laotian
people to join the revolution and not to cooperate with the Royal Lao
Government. The section also endorsed operational agent plans submitted by
the SLMR Military Staff’s Special Operations Reconnaissance (Military
Intelligence) Section for submission to the SLMR Political Staff's Military
Security Section for final operational approval. The section was involved in
dispatching cadres in military proselytizing (recruitment) operations and
engaged in fifth column penetrations of FAR. The section monitored the
activities of subordinate provincial unit political staff enemy military
proselytizing components. Each of the seven provinces in the SLMR had an
estimated six-man enemy proselytizing subsection with one CDV'adviser.
Commanded by eight LPLA officers and four PAVN CDV advisers, the
SLMR Enemy Military Proselytizing Section had a total of about 200
personnel under its command.
Following the official establishment of the LPDR in December 1975, the
Supreme LPLA Headquarters was installed in Vientiane as the LPDR
Ministry of National Defense (MND), and Laos was divided subsequently into
four military regions. Since PAVN presence in Laos has not radically
diminished in recent years, there is no reason to believe that PAVN
intelligence and security assistance and controlling influence has diminished.
On the contrary, the nunber of PAVN intelligence and security advisers has
probably increased, as reflected by current reporting.
The CDV Foreign Affairs Office continues to be responsible for
monitoring the development of the LPDR MND General Political Depart-
ment's Enemy Military Proselytizing Department, which has an estimated
1,200 staff personnel with at least 60 CDV advisers and an unknown number
of detention camps for former FAR personnel.
Kompucheo ‘
As background, CDV predecessor organizations began developing their
capability in Kampuchea in 1947, when small Khmer armed bands accepted
as '
-seeker’
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