Intelligence and Security Operations of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam Ministry of National Defense

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Korean propaganda themes included praise for North Korean Premier Kil Il-sung and living conditions in North Korea; appeals to ROK personnel to.request their president to recall them home; offers of political asylum for ROKdeserters and defectors; and pleas to ROK personnel to stop the killing of SouthVietnamese civilians and the" destruction of civilian homes and livelihood.Leaflets were distributed by subordinate provincial EMPS echelons at ROKunit locations and in the predicted paths of ROK units on operations. Membersof the North Korean team were also involved in the interrogation of ROKprisoners, who were usually indoctrinated and released as examples of NorthKorean good faith for subsequent propaganda exploitation.
The content of North Korean-produced psychological .warfare materialswas not coordinated with the Region 5 EMPHS except to pass on leaflets fordistribution. The Region 5 EMPS initially had no Korean-language specialistsand was unable to check on the content of the North Korean propagandathemes. All contact was channeled through one Vietnamese-speaking NorthKorean captain. As time passed, the Region 5 EMPS began to realize that theirNorth Korean counterparts were there to further the interests of the NorthKorean Government and had little concern for the Vietnamese revolutionarycause. On Region 5 EMPS insistance, the North Koreans conducted a one-yearKorean-language course for Region 5 EMPS personnel in 1967. The course,however, failed to produce Korean-speaking Region 5 EMPS linguists. Mostinstruction was given through a Chinese-speaking North Korean interpreter.Region 5 EMPS trainees were taught mostly North Korean slogans, and wererequired to memorize and recite North Korean propaganda leaflet themes.
The same situation prevailed in the COSVN area of jurisdiction insouthern Vietnam. The COSVN Military Proselytizing Section (MPS) neitherpossessed nor expressed interest in developing a special military proselytizingprogram tailored for Third World Military Assistance Command forces. It hadno staff personnel who could speak, write or understand Filipino, Thai, orKorean. In July 1967, at the insistance of the COSVN Current AffairsCommittee, the COSVN MPS agreed to accept and to receive bimonthlyshipments of North Korean-produced leaflets for distribution by subordinatefield components near ROK installations in the Saigon Capital area. Later, inearly July 1968, a three-man North Korean military proselytizing delegationarrived at the COSVN MPS headquarters where they were briefed on theorganizational system and activities of the COSVN MPS. COSVN MPS ChiefTran Van Du conducted the briefings which were designed to give the NorthKoreans an on-the-spot assessment of Vietnamese military proselytizingmethods of operations.
An April 1968 dated captured document from the “enemy proselytizingcell staffed by Korean personnel of the Quang Da Special Region to comradesof the People's Liberation Army of Quang Da” confirmed North Koreanpresence in South Vietnam. In this document, the Koreans congratulated theQuang Da Special Region (QDSR) for attacks on the ROK Blue DragonDivision and for the capture of ROK personnel.
In spring 1968, the Region 5 EMPS requested the CDV headquarters inHanoi to provide it with CDV Korean linguists in order to establish its own
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