Documents / FOIA release

Intelligence and Security Operations of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam Ministry of National Defense

Central Intelligence Agency · 1979-12-01 · 120 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is a December 1979 Central Intelligence Agency study published by the Directorate of Operations Counterintelligence Staff. It describes the Enemy Proselytizing Department (Cuc Dich Van) of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam Ministry of National Defense. The study traces the department's origins from 1941 through the French and Vietnam wars. It covers psychological warfare, fifth column penetration of ARVN and allied forces, the handling of US and allied prisoners of war, and the postwar reeducation of former ARVN personnel. It contains no material on UFOs.

  • p. 13 …South Vietnam maintained contact with the CBV headquarters in Hanoi through radio communications, couriers flown on…
  • p. 14 …All power rested in the Lao Dong Party's forward COSVN headquarters with PAVN in full…
  • p. 18 …Interrogation results were sent to the provincial unit and / or military region headquarters for followup exploitation…
  • p. 25 …similarly studied and sent to the CDV headquarters in Hanoi for incorporation into POW indoctrination, and…
  • p. 26 …South Vietnam in spring 1965, the CDV headquarters in Hanoi instructed its forward commands in South…
  • p. 27 …operational control of PAVN Military Region 4 headquartered in Vinh, Nghe An Province. Consequently, the CDV…
  • p. 28 …The PDV headquarters was composed of 75 personnel assigned to six major sections. About 200 personnel…
  • p. 29 …The handwritten statements were also sent to the CDV headquarters in Hanoi where they ‘were used…
  • p. 30 …Established in May 1969 with la 25-man headquarters staff, it had three 25-man detention…
  • p. 34 …In spring 1968, the Region 5 EMPS requested the CDV headquarters inHanoi to provide it with…
  • p. 35 …It was unaware of the fact that the Region 5 EMPS headquarters now had three Korean…
  • p. 36 …beenasked to leave by the Region 5 headquarters which had discovered them. performing other than agreed…
  • p. 40 …These advisory groups were assigned to the Supreme LPLA Headquarters, and to the three LPLA military…
  • p. 41 …Most were prepared by the SLMR Enemy Military Proselytizing Section headquarters, although subordinate provincial political staff…
  • p. 43 …personnel, who were organized into a small headquarters staff, at least one 30-man detention camp…
  • p. 48 …Other penetrations included a translator with a liaison group attached to the headquarters of the US…
  • p. 53 …RVN National Police Command Regional Headquarters in Can Tho; the Lo Te Prison; US advisory and…
  • p. 54 …4 MPS had over 200 personnel under its control organized into a 50-man headquarters staff…
  • p. 55 …40 personnel organized into a five- man headquarters staff and four courier stations. 8. B9 Printing…
  • p. 56 …Directly subordinate to its headquarters staff were two 40-man courier stations which were each organized…
  • p. 57 …The Region 2 MPS headquarters staff was organized into a: 1. 2. I 3. Administrative Subsection…
  • p. 60 …Among those arrested were penetrations of the ARVN I Corps MSS Headquarters; the personal chauffeur of…
  • p. 61 …provincial EMPS, organized into a 42-man headquarters staff with seven subordinate subsections as follows: , F…
  • p. 63 …These staff components monitored and provided professional guidance to the 40-man headquarters staffs of the…
  • p. 71 …Tan Son Nhut) Air Divisions, the VNAF Headquarters, Aircraft Control and Warning Group, Air Logistics Command…
  • p. 80 …Born about 1925 in North Vietnam, Ban held the rank of major in the CDV headquarters…
  • p. 85 …Between 1961 and February 1967, he was assigned to the COSVN MPS Penetration Subsection headquarters where…
  • p. 88 …the rank of captain to the SVNLA headquarters, where he was assigned to the Enemy Proselytizing…
  • p. 89 …85 ‘SE-GR-EL the CDV headquarters in Hanoi, he was sent to South Vietnam in…
  • p. 90 …Between April and June 1968, he was assigned to a SVNLA Forward Headquarters in Subregion 1…
  • p. 94 _seea-er- to an unspecified position in the CDV headquarters. Holding the rank of major, he…
  • p. 96 …In April 1951, he was reassigned to the MND headquarters before becoming the head of the…
  • p. 102 …It is North Vietnam's main pen- itentiary and the administrative headquarters for its entire prison…
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NOFORN
“Beginning 26 March (1975) Danang city was in a chaotic situation . . .
3,200 new recruits undergoing training at the Hoa Cam military training
center revolted, deserted and joined the revolution or returned to their
families . . . self-defense forces personnel and the people led the way for our
troops to quickly capture enemy positions and holdsurrendered enemy troops
and POWs. .
“On joining the campaign . . . the (Saigon) municipal unit also included
the main force regiments which had already been deployed in Gia Dinh, not_
to speak of our cadres and combatants who for many years had been carrying
out special activities in the city or working in enemy organs and who were
supplying us with timely and vital information as they awaited the arrival of
the great army."
“The total secrecy of the plan had to be preserved since it was to be
disseminated to all wards, subwards, and our political and military
proselytizing bases in the city. . . . The Saigon-Gia Dinh party committee
printed and disseminated hundreds of thousands of leaflets and set up armed
propaganda units. . . . In a few days, we introduced into the center of the city
many hundred more cadres and armed unit members. . . . The tasks of
proselytizing the troops and personnel of the puppet administration were also
urgently carried out before the general offensive day. Our cadres responsible
for these tasks in Saigon, so very persevering and skillful in the past, were now
in the new situation very alert and courageous. They contacted enemy troops
and showed them the path to save themselves, their families and relatives and
to bring these oppressed people back to the just cause and the nation. Some of
our cadres were arrested and killed. However, their sacrifices for the
revolution won the sympathy and hearts of countless enemy troops who were
now awaiting an opportunity to act. So, when we launch a general offensive on
Saigon, favorable conditions should be promptly created for these policemen
and personnel of the enemy administration to side with the revolution and the
people to fight the stubborn enemy ringleaders. The revolutionary administra-
tion's policies towards prisoners of war and surrendering enemy troops should
be urgently disseminated well before and during the general offensive."
Senior General Van Tien Dung, “Great Spring Victory,” Nhan Dan
April-May 1976."
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FOIA release, from the cia-readingroom collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is above. 120 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.