Intelligence and Security Operations of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam Ministry of National Defense

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NOFORN
“Beginning 26 March (1975) Danang city was in a chaotic situation . . .
3,200 new recruits undergoing training at the Hoa Cam military training
center revolted, deserted and joined the revolution or returned to their
families . . . self-defense forces personnel and the people led the way for our
troops to quickly capture enemy positions and holdsurrendered enemy troops
and POWs. .
“On joining the campaign . . . the (Saigon) municipal unit also included
the main force regiments which had already been deployed in Gia Dinh, not_
to speak of our cadres and combatants who for many years had been carrying
out special activities in the city or working in enemy organs and who were
supplying us with timely and vital information as they awaited the arrival of
the great army."
“The total secrecy of the plan had to be preserved since it was to be
disseminated to all wards, subwards, and our political and military
proselytizing bases in the city. . . . The Saigon-Gia Dinh party committee
printed and disseminated hundreds of thousands of leaflets and set up armed
propaganda units. . . . In a few days, we introduced into the center of the city
many hundred more cadres and armed unit members. . . . The tasks of
proselytizing the troops and personnel of the puppet administration were also
urgently carried out before the general offensive day. Our cadres responsible
for these tasks in Saigon, so very persevering and skillful in the past, were now
in the new situation very alert and courageous. They contacted enemy troops
and showed them the path to save themselves, their families and relatives and
to bring these oppressed people back to the just cause and the nation. Some of
our cadres were arrested and killed. However, their sacrifices for the
revolution won the sympathy and hearts of countless enemy troops who were
now awaiting an opportunity to act. So, when we launch a general offensive on
Saigon, favorable conditions should be promptly created for these policemen
and personnel of the enemy administration to side with the revolution and the
people to fight the stubborn enemy ringleaders. The revolutionary administra-
tion's policies towards prisoners of war and surrendering enemy troops should
be urgently disseminated well before and during the general offensive."
Senior General Van Tien Dung, “Great Spring Victory,” Nhan Dan
April-May 1976."
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