Documents / FOIA release
This is a December 1979 Central Intelligence Agency study published by the Directorate of Operations Counterintelligence Staff. It describes the Enemy Proselytizing Department (Cuc Dich Van) of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam Ministry of National Defense. The study traces the department's origins from 1941 through the French and Vietnam wars. It covers psychological warfare, fifth column penetration of ARVN and allied forces, the handling of US and allied prisoners of war, and the postwar reeducation of former ARVN personnel. It contains no material on UFOs.
“Headquarters”33 pages
I J -'3 - 7. _ 5'E€'R'E-T- POWs were temporarily detained and exploited for perishable tactical military information. : Following the overthrow of Khmer Chief of State Norodom Sihanouk in March 1970 and the installation of the American-backed Khmer Republic Government (GKR) of Lon Nol, COSVN and its SVNLA were tasked with operations in Kampuchea. The PDV then staffed the combined civilian and enemy proselytizing (dan dich van) components of five PAVN/SVNLA military regions established in Kampuchea. Over 300 PDV and 200 MPS personnel were committed to action in Kampuchea. The PDV headquarters was composed of 75 personnel assigned to six major sections. About 200 personnel were assigned to PDV detention facilities, and about 1,500 personnel were assigned to subordinate enemy proselytizing field components in, the southern half of South Vietnam. The PDV headquarters was organized as follows into a: 1. Command Section: headed by CDV Colonel Ngo Dai Trai. Trai was assisted by two deputies, CDV Majors Pham Tran Ban and Bui Thanh Ngon, and one English-speaking interpreter/translator. ' 2. Administrative Section: 20 personnel. 3. Battlefield Proselytizing Section: 10 personnel who monitoried the results of interrogation and indoctrination sessions conducted by the propaganda and enemy research sections. The section studied the results and prepared enemy proselytizing programs for implementa- tion by the enemy proselytizing sections of division-size units and of six military region “political staffs, which each had a 50-man “staff, including a 25-man detention camp facility for captured POWs. Regiment, group, subregion, and province unit political staffs had a 10- man enemy proselytizing subsection. Battalion and district-size units had a three-man enemy proselytizing cell headed by their deputy political officers. Reports were sent from field elements in a vertical chain of command to the PDV Battlefield Proselytizing Section for review and collation into reports for the CDV headquarters in Hanoi, the PAVN/SVNLA Military Staff and Political Staff Departments for distribution to their Military Intelligence and Military Security Offices, and to the COSVN Military Affairs Committee. 4. Enemy Research Section: 10 personnel responsible for the interroga- tion of US/Allied and ARVN POWs for information on the history, morale, combat effectiveness, and biographical data on division-level units and their commanders. Emphasis was placed on the identification of personnel who opposed the war, had deserted, or who had refused to take part in combat actions. Attention was given to the degree of racism in US combat units, and on the relationships between enlisted and officer personnel. 5. Propaganda Section: 15 personnel responsible for the political indoctrination of US/Allied and ARVN POWs. Following oral group sessions, POWs were required to make a handwritten statement 22 ‘SECRE- I -_.._._~ -. ..-.....__-., _____,=, l.~..,_, . . l wfihtrvfli-'::1z»I~m\r|n-v-:‘.r.:sr~ _4%'.'~Q1 r \ 1 : Q‘ i_.; : a'~“"= .* . . ca mm oaonn ___.. '7 7 /
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FOIA release, from the cia-readingroom collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is above. 120 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.