Intelligence and Security Operations of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam Ministry of National Defense

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proselytizing components; and spotted potential fifth column agent candidates
amongst ARVN POWs for the COSVN MPS.
In July 1965, the CDV dispatched its first groups of English-‘speaking
psychological warfare and interrogation specialists. All were graduates of the
Hanoi Foreign Language Institute. About 50 were assigned to the SVNLA
PDV and about 20 were assigned to the Region 5 Enemy Military
Proselytizing Section (Ban Binh Dich Van/EMPS) in Central Vietnam. One,
Nguyen Be, had participated in the exploitation of US pilots in North Vietnam
before his assignment to the Region 5 EMPS.
I
In response to the large buildup of US forces in South Vietnam, ‘Hanoi
ordered the restructure of the CDV forward commands in South Vietnam in
early 1967. COSVN and its SVNLA relinquished direct control over the
Region 5 Party Committee in Central Vietnam, which now fell under the
direct control of Hanoi.'Although COSVN and its SVNLA becameresponsible
for party and military operations in the southern half of Vietnam, it
coordinated its operations with Region 5 in Central Vietnam. The northern
provinces of Quang Tri and Thua Thien and Hue City werereorganized into
the Tri-Thien-Hue Military Region (TTHMR) under the operational control of
PAVN Military Region 4 headquartered in Vinh, Nghe An Province.
Consequently, the CDV established direct control over its operations in Region
5 and in the TTHMR. The Region 5 EMPS coordinated its operations with the
COSVN MPS and with the SVNLA PDV.
The SVNLA Enemy Proselytizing Office (PDV) ‘
Between I968 and March 1970, the CDV SVNLA Enemy Proselytizing
Office (PDV) forward command administered at least seven detention camps
for captured US/ Allied civilian and military personnel, and at least three other
detention camps for ARVN personnel. All captured foreign civilian personnel
were categorized as enemy intelligence agents, and were detained and treated
as captured foreign military personnel in PDV detention facilities.
In April I970, the PDV camp system was reoganized since the anticipated
receipt of large numbers of US/ Allied and ARVN POWs never materialized
after the I968 Tet (Vietnamese New Year) general offensive. Between April
1970 and I973, the PDV administered four detention camps for captured
US/Allied civilian and military personnel, and at least two other camps for
ARVN personnel. The PDV had no responsibility for the detention of
PAVN/SVNLA deserters, criminal and party offenders, which was the
responsibility of the SVNLA Political Staff Department's Military Security
Office (Phong Bao Ve). The PDV also had no responsibility for the detention
of captured RVN civilian prisoners, which was the responsibility of the
COSVN Security Office (So An Ninh). .
PDV held POWs were made available for interrogation to the COSVN
MPS and to the SVNLA Political Staff Department's Military Security Office.
The latter was responsible for military counterintelligence interrogations. The
SVNLA Military Staff Department's Military Intelligence Office (Phong Quan
Bao) was informed of the capture of all US/Allied civilian and military
personnel, and sent its own interrogators to the capturing unit where the
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