Intelligence and Security Operations of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam Ministry of National Defense

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The American Target in South Vietnam -
Following the August 1964 Gulf of Tonkin incident, the capture of the‘
first US naval aviator in North Vietnam, and the introduction of US combat
forces in South Vietnam in spring 1965, the CDV headquarters in Hanoi
instructed its forward commands in South Vietnam to initiate comprehensive
programs for US and Allied military personnel in Vietnam. Until spring 1965,
COSVN and its CDV forward commands had no comprehensive program for
US and Allied military forces in South Vietnam.
COSVN, which was then responsible for all party and military operations
in South Vietnam, was tasked with fulfilling this requirement which had been
handed down to the CDV by the Central Military Party Affairs Committee of
the Lao Dong Party's Central Committee. The COSVN Military Affairs
Committee entrusted, the execution of this program to the CDV COSVNMilitary Proselytizing Section (MPS) and the CDV SVNLA Political Staff
Departments Enemy Proselytizing Office (Phong Dich Van/PDV) forward
commands. COSVN Military Affairs Committee members, Major Generals
Tran Do and Tran Luong, supervised the programs implemented by the
COSVN MPS and by the SVNLA PDV. Major General Tran Do supervised the
SVNLA PDV headed by CDV Lieutenant Colonel Ngo Dai Trai, who had
been transferred from the COSVN MPS. The COSVN MPS was supervised by
Major General Tran Luong, who left the running of the MPS to CDVLieutenant Colonel Tran Van Du.
The COSVN MPS Propaganda Subsection was tasked with responsibilities
for preparing psychological warfare leaflets and radio broadcast materials in
coordinated action with the SVNLA PDV. PDV Chief Ngo Dai Trai was well
versed in this field, having headed the COSVN MPS Propaganda Subsection
between 1963 and early 1965. The MPS Propaganda Subsection monitored US
Armed Forces Radio, British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC), and Voice of
America (VOA) broadcasts for exploitable information to use in its preparation
of psychological warfare materials against US military personnel. Most MPS
prepared leaflets, handbills, and pamphlets consisted of impassioned claims
that the Vietnam War could not be understood nor effectively fought byforeigners. Racial themes were stressed. The MPS Propaganda Subsection was
particularly interested in collecting information on US civil rights and black
power movements for exploitable propaganda themes against US Negro
personnel, and against US prisoners of war (POWs). All US POWs were
considered to have potential for psychological warfare exploitation. The MPS
was charged with the mission of “promoting the antiwar movement and
urging US and satellite troops to refuse to take part in operations and to
demand prompt return home."
The SVNLA _PDV had primary responsibility for the administration,
indoctrination, interrogation, and psychological exploitation of ARVN and
US/Allied civilian and military POWs. The PDV compiled information from
interrogations to draft psychological warfare materials; maintained central
POW records and logs; arranged POW release ceremonies; drafted enemy
proselytizing programs for implementation by PAVN/SVNLA enemy
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