Documents / FOIA release

Intelligence and Security Operations of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam Ministry of National Defense

Central Intelligence Agency · 1979-12-01 · 120 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is a December 1979 Central Intelligence Agency study published by the Directorate of Operations Counterintelligence Staff. It describes the Enemy Proselytizing Department (Cuc Dich Van) of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam Ministry of National Defense. The study traces the department's origins from 1941 through the French and Vietnam wars. It covers psychological warfare, fifth column penetration of ARVN and allied forces, the handling of US and allied prisoners of war, and the postwar reeducation of former ARVN personnel. It contains no material on UFOs.

  • p. 13 …South Vietnam maintained contact with the CBV headquarters in Hanoi through radio communications, couriers flown on…
  • p. 14 …All power rested in the Lao Dong Party's forward COSVN headquarters with PAVN in full…
  • p. 18 …Interrogation results were sent to the provincial unit and / or military region headquarters for followup exploitation…
  • p. 25 …similarly studied and sent to the CDV headquarters in Hanoi for incorporation into POW indoctrination, and…
  • p. 26 …South Vietnam in spring 1965, the CDV headquarters in Hanoi instructed its forward commands in South…
  • p. 27 …operational control of PAVN Military Region 4 headquartered in Vinh, Nghe An Province. Consequently, the CDV…
  • p. 28 …The PDV headquarters was composed of 75 personnel assigned to six major sections. About 200 personnel…
  • p. 29 …The handwritten statements were also sent to the CDV headquarters in Hanoi where they ‘were used…
  • p. 30 …Established in May 1969 with la 25-man headquarters staff, it had three 25-man detention…
  • p. 34 …In spring 1968, the Region 5 EMPS requested the CDV headquarters inHanoi to provide it with…
  • p. 35 …It was unaware of the fact that the Region 5 EMPS headquarters now had three Korean…
  • p. 36 …beenasked to leave by the Region 5 headquarters which had discovered them. performing other than agreed…
  • p. 40 …These advisory groups were assigned to the Supreme LPLA Headquarters, and to the three LPLA military…
  • p. 41 …Most were prepared by the SLMR Enemy Military Proselytizing Section headquarters, although subordinate provincial political staff…
  • p. 43 …personnel, who were organized into a small headquarters staff, at least one 30-man detention camp…
  • p. 48 …Other penetrations included a translator with a liaison group attached to the headquarters of the US…
  • p. 53 …RVN National Police Command Regional Headquarters in Can Tho; the Lo Te Prison; US advisory and…
  • p. 54 …4 MPS had over 200 personnel under its control organized into a 50-man headquarters staff…
  • p. 55 …40 personnel organized into a five- man headquarters staff and four courier stations. 8. B9 Printing…
  • p. 56 …Directly subordinate to its headquarters staff were two 40-man courier stations which were each organized…
  • p. 57 …The Region 2 MPS headquarters staff was organized into a: 1. 2. I 3. Administrative Subsection…
  • p. 60 …Among those arrested were penetrations of the ARVN I Corps MSS Headquarters; the personal chauffeur of…
  • p. 61 …provincial EMPS, organized into a 42-man headquarters staff with seven subordinate subsections as follows: , F…
  • p. 63 …These staff components monitored and provided professional guidance to the 40-man headquarters staffs of the…
  • p. 71 …Tan Son Nhut) Air Divisions, the VNAF Headquarters, Aircraft Control and Warning Group, Air Logistics Command…
  • p. 80 …Born about 1925 in North Vietnam, Ban held the rank of major in the CDV headquarters…
  • p. 85 …Between 1961 and February 1967, he was assigned to the COSVN MPS Penetration Subsection headquarters where…
  • p. 88 …the rank of captain to the SVNLA headquarters, where he was assigned to the Enemy Proselytizing…
  • p. 89 …85 ‘SE-GR-EL the CDV headquarters in Hanoi, he was sent to South Vietnam in…
  • p. 90 …Between April and June 1968, he was assigned to a SVNLA Forward Headquarters in Subregion 1…
  • p. 94 _seea-er- to an unspecified position in the CDV headquarters. Holding the rank of major, he…
  • p. 96 …In April 1951, he was reassigned to the MND headquarters before becoming the head of the…
  • p. 102 …It is North Vietnam's main pen- itentiary and the administrative headquarters for its entire prison…
.,;,-
‘
.=.-
L23
.5
*;=»‘$;K::
=w;.
.
+::
5-”: ~
If-' 1
,5-'5"?
I
Y
4
1» ~:'L_,
;. r. ,1-.»
.,,¢.._-;,_>
_
\!'lr:‘_'
.41 '
.-" 7‘ cf
-‘liv ‘
1
‘» 5'}
."*r.
~:~_1fl4;:'.f'5'
_<‘.. 1;;-.»-.,
: ~.'.'. t--.'<!*'~~~
'4 -‘.1 -:;,;’i'I. -
'
.~§§ ‘.""?§'<! ‘
t
. A1". ¢
i "1' .».-_.»
ar-,.
- -~-
.\T:‘ ‘
l
—SE-GR-E-T—
National Defense, a Politburo member; and finally by Lao Dong Party First
Secretary Le Duan, Chairman of the Lao Dong Party Central Committee's
Central Military Party Affairs Committee.
Despite the fact that some US POWs were labeled by BCA and MND
CDV and CNC interrogators as "adamant" (cung dau) or "stubborn" (ngoan
co) because of their uncooperativeness, they were still considered to be
potentially valuable sources of information and suitable for future exploita-
tion. This particularly applied to Category B prisoners.
Category A and B POWs were not exploited for the purposes of collecting
intelligence information through their contacts in the US or_ by attempting to
persuadetheir contacts to engage in antiwar activities. This was not done
because it might have led to the surfacing of their identities. The identity of
Category A POWs was carefully guarded because identifying them as POWs
rather than as missing or killed-in-action would permit the US to employ
countermeasures to negate the value of the information which they provided.
The identity of Category B POWs was similarly not revealed because some
may have not survived the interrogations or other techniques used to coerce
them to cooperate.
After a POW was initially categorized, CDV and CNC representatives
met to discuss how the CDV indoctrination and exploitation plan was to be
implemented and what techniques would be used on the POW. CNC
interrogators complied with CDV recommendations. BCA prison authorities
and interrogators were also required to follow CDY recommendations on the
billeting, feeding, indoctrination and interrogation of the POW. The CNC
conducted interrogations for military information with or without a CDV
cadre present. In the case of a "stubborn" POW, a CDV cadre was present in
the interrogation room with the CNC interrogator. The CDV was required to
make all US military POWs available for CNC interrogation. The CNC also
maintained a master listing of all US military POWs captured in North
Vietnam. Sanitized listings were prepared for other armed forces branches on
only those POWs who fell within their area of jurisdiction. Naval and Air
Force Air Defense interrogators obtained access to POWs through the CNC,
and systematically exploited specific technical subjects falling within their
areas of jurisdiction.
With the assistance of the Soviet KGB, the BCA and the MND prepared
various types of interrogation questionnaires to be used by BCA and MND
interrogators and indoctrination specialists. US POW interrogations conducted
by either the BCA or by the MND covered the following:
' American combat tactics, techniques and order of battle, especially
AAA and SAM evasive tactics. ~
Q American personnel, morale, fighting spirit and motivation factors.
- American weaponry, technical equipment, and war materiel; with
special attention given to American use of armor, armored vehicles, and
aircraft ECM equipment.
~ American knowledge of PAVN forces in South Vietnam.
'1 -
-,.4r_i'* 1 7
4ECR£L
'-1.T.:¢!3:4'¥": 45*} 3 :
" - -
F _._r_-,-,‘,_ -._ -
\
J
I
\1\'fi'\ OQQH1 1 __._ '7 /P“

Not linked to a story yet.

About this file

FOIA release, from the cia-readingroom collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is above. 120 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.