Intelligence and Security Operations of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam Ministry of National Defense

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—SE-GR-E-T—
National Defense, a Politburo member; and finally by Lao Dong Party First
Secretary Le Duan, Chairman of the Lao Dong Party Central Committee's
Central Military Party Affairs Committee.
Despite the fact that some US POWs were labeled by BCA and MND
CDV and CNC interrogators as "adamant" (cung dau) or "stubborn" (ngoan
co) because of their uncooperativeness, they were still considered to be
potentially valuable sources of information and suitable for future exploita-
tion. This particularly applied to Category B prisoners.
Category A and B POWs were not exploited for the purposes of collecting
intelligence information through their contacts in the US or_ by attempting to
persuadetheir contacts to engage in antiwar activities. This was not done
because it might have led to the surfacing of their identities. The identity of
Category A POWs was carefully guarded because identifying them as POWs
rather than as missing or killed-in-action would permit the US to employ
countermeasures to negate the value of the information which they provided.
The identity of Category B POWs was similarly not revealed because some
may have not survived the interrogations or other techniques used to coerce
them to cooperate.
After a POW was initially categorized, CDV and CNC representatives
met to discuss how the CDV indoctrination and exploitation plan was to be
implemented and what techniques would be used on the POW. CNC
interrogators complied with CDV recommendations. BCA prison authorities
and interrogators were also required to follow CDY recommendations on the
billeting, feeding, indoctrination and interrogation of the POW. The CNC
conducted interrogations for military information with or without a CDV
cadre present. In the case of a "stubborn" POW, a CDV cadre was present in
the interrogation room with the CNC interrogator. The CDV was required to
make all US military POWs available for CNC interrogation. The CNC also
maintained a master listing of all US military POWs captured in North
Vietnam. Sanitized listings were prepared for other armed forces branches on
only those POWs who fell within their area of jurisdiction. Naval and Air
Force Air Defense interrogators obtained access to POWs through the CNC,
and systematically exploited specific technical subjects falling within their
areas of jurisdiction.
With the assistance of the Soviet KGB, the BCA and the MND prepared
various types of interrogation questionnaires to be used by BCA and MND
interrogators and indoctrination specialists. US POW interrogations conducted
by either the BCA or by the MND covered the following:
' American combat tactics, techniques and order of battle, especially
AAA and SAM evasive tactics. ~
Q American personnel, morale, fighting spirit and motivation factors.
- American weaponry, technical equipment, and war materiel; with
special attention given to American use of armor, armored vehicles, and
aircraft ECM equipment.
~ American knowledge of PAVN forces in South Vietnam.
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