Intelligence and Security Operations of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam Ministry of National Defense

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Based on the psychological assessment, CDV officers drafted anindoctrination and exploitation plan based on the degree of the POW'scooperation. The CDV recommended what treatment and what interrogationtechniques would be used in exploiting the POW. The'CDV indoctrinationand exploitation plan included an evaluation of the POW's character; familybackground, strong and weak personality characteristics; his attitude before,during and after capture; and how the prisoner should be approached infuture indoctrination and detailed interrogation sessions. Indoctrination planswere approved by the CDV Policy Office and then by CDV Director MajorGeneral Le Quang Dao, a Lao Dong Party Central Committee member and adeputy director of the MND General Political Department.
The exploitation of the POW depended upon’ the category to which hewas assigned. The categorization of US POWs depended upon the affiliationof the initial capturing/screening unit; the extent to which he had beenexploited before his transfer to Hanoi; the POW's apparent areas ofknowledgeability established during preliminary screening; the POW's age,grade, intelligence, and position; evidence of potential compromise of DRVnational security; national origin and race; assessment of the POW's intent ordesire to escape; and, probably most important, the POW's degree ofcooperation with his captors.
Using these factors as criteria for exploitation, the CDV segregated USPOWs into the following three categories:
~ Category A: Those considered special because of the importance of theinformation which they offered. ‘
- Category B: Those considered to have the same potential but whorefused to cooperate.
~ Category C: Those whose continued presence in North Vietnam afterthorough interrogation offered little or no advantages to Hanoi. Thesewere released whenever it best served Hanoi's_purposes. Those in thiscategory were usually labeled “progressive” and had voluntarily turnedover material in their possession upon capture. "Progressive" POWsprovided all information available to them, including information aboutthemselves and their friends, relatives and families; and had beensuccessfully indoctrinated into realizing the "realities of the war and itseffect upon the DRV.” Not every “progressive” POW was suitable forexploitation because of intellectual limitations; because they had few orno contacts in the US of political value; because some were overlyconcerned with the well-being of their families and the negative effecttheir actions might have; and others refused to engage in propaganda orcollection activities even though they otherwise cooperated with theircaptors. .
Within the MND, the CDV Policy Office and the CNC were responsiblefor determining whether a POW would be eligible for release. Theserecommendations were then approved by Major General Le Quang Dao, theCDV Director; Lieutenant General Song Hao, the MND General PoliticalDepartment Director; Senior General Vo Nguyen Giap, the Minister of
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