Documents / FOIA release

(Estimated Pub Date) the Challenge of Ethnic Conflict to National and International Order in the 1990S: Geographic Perspectives- October 1995

Central Intelligence Agency · 1995-10-01 · 205 pages · text from the file's own layer

This Central Intelligence Agency conference report, numbered RTT 95-10039 and dated October 1995, presents the proceedings of a conference held 30 September to 1 October 1993. The CIA's Geographic Resources Division sponsored the conference. In it, academic geographers, anthropologists and US Government officials examined ethnic conflict by region, covering Eastern Europe, the former Soviet Union, Africa, Latin America, the Middle East, Asia and South Asia. The report also discusses what these conflicts mean for US policy. It does not deal with UFOs or unidentified aerial phenomena.

  • p. 120 …To follow Ben Anderson (1983), it is the feeling of “othemess” one experiences while in exile…
  • p. 121 …In Ben Anderson’s terms, Dr. Sun was engaged in “stretching the short, tight skin of…
  • p. 126 …2018/06/01 C00123268 References Anderson, Benedict. Imagined Communities: Reflec- tions on the Origin and Spread…
  • p. 133 …erected on the ruins of ancient civilizations (Anderson; 1991). The same passions that inflamed modern European…
  • p. 135 …2018/06/01 C00123268 References Anderson, Benedict 1991. Imagined Communities: Hickey, Gerald 1982. Sons of the…
  • p. 182 …and Society, Boston: Allen & Unwin, 1987. J. Anderson, “Nationalist ideology and territory," in Approved for Release…
Approved for Release: 2018/06/01 C00123268
ratio of 10 UN forces to l rebel force is needed to con-
tain the anarchy; with the UN’s current resources, that
is not feasible. Furthermore, countries that participate
in the UN peacekeeping operations, as in Somalia, and
that experience casualties, will develop a great reluc-
tance to participate in support of this kind of policing
action.
Perhaps there ought to be standing regional forces in
Africa, South America, and Central America for
emergencies of this kind so that imperialist powers do
not get involved in the kind of peacemaking that get
soldiers killed. I am encouraged that ECOMOG, the
West African force, has achieved as much as it has. I
still believe that, with the UN’s limitations, having
standing regional forces is the way for regional prob-
lems to be solved. I am a great believer in UN inter-
vention, butl am not sure that the United Nations has
the resources to intervene at the level it should have.
DR. HONEY: I think what really needs to be done is
to formulate a UN policy that provides a generic,
rather than ad hoc, structure for intervening. I think
the difficulty we have now is that we are building a
house without a blueprint. Obviously, the world is not
going to stop, but, if we reallyare going to have suc-
cessful interventions, we need ito figure out institution-
ally how they will work. Then I think we will have a
chance of some successes.
QUESTION: You had mentioned the need for interna-
tional intervention in South Africa—potential UN
intervention. I know that, currently, we’ re talking
about election monitors. Is that sufficient to tide South
Africa over until the election and afterwards?
DR. DE BLIJ: In the case of South Africa, I think a
massive intervention that might keep the peace there,
should it be needed, would pay for itself for a century
to come, whereas that might not be the case in, say
Somalia or Rwanda. _
DR. HONEY: I am more optimistic about South
Africa’s future than Professor de Blij. We do not have
a crystal ball, but I have a hunch that pragmatism is
going to prevail. Clearly the ANC leadership, despite
its at least titular Marxist past, understands that it is
going to have to run that economy well to be able to
make it work. I think that there is going to be a tre-
mendous effort by the leadership to hold things
together. There are so many incentives in terms of the
potential for South Africa that I think the possibility
that people will actually get together and make things
work is every bit as high as the possibility that we will
have a conflagration.
DR. DE BLIJ: I think that Professor Honey might be
right except for the effect of sanctions. Those of us
who supported the sanctions helped create in South
Africa an ungovernable minority of hundreds of thou-
sands of young, uneducated Africans who said “liber-
ation before education.” These youths will now be
Nelson Mandela’s major problem and are the major
source of violence in the townships. Those people are
not retrievable. Unemployment in South Africa is 48
percent, not because there are not people to employ
but because they have no skills to employ them with.
These people are going to have a revolution of rising
expectations, and, believe me, a revolution South
Africa will get.
Another problem will be the integration of the armed
forces.
QUESTION: Regarding your point that US forces
should not be in Somalia, is that a reflection of what’s
happening now or would you never have sent them
there in the first place?
DR. DE BLIJ: I never would have sent them in the
first place. I thought our job was to feed people. It
could have been done from the air. It could have been
done with the help of the agencies already there. I
think our tactics in Somalia were wrong. Frankly, it is
going exactly the way I though it would go. It is a
quagmire, and it may, in fact, lead to a fragmented
Somalia in the end, that is not what we had in mind. If
feeding the population is the objective, it ought to be
done from a distance. What is now happening——the
policing action that you can see coming--builds
resentment to the presence of a large foreign force and
is not acceptable.
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Approved for Release: 2018/06/01 C00123268

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FOIA release, from the cia-readingroom collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is above. 205 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.