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(Estimated Pub Date) the Challenge of Ethnic Conflict to National and International Order in the 1990S: Geographic Perspectives- October 1995

Central Intelligence Agency · 1995-10-01 · 205 pages · text from the file's own layer

This Central Intelligence Agency conference report, numbered RTT 95-10039 and dated October 1995, presents the proceedings of a conference held 30 September to 1 October 1993. The CIA's Geographic Resources Division sponsored the conference. In it, academic geographers, anthropologists and US Government officials examined ethnic conflict by region, covering Eastern Europe, the former Soviet Union, Africa, Latin America, the Middle East, Asia and South Asia. The report also discusses what these conflicts mean for US policy. It does not deal with UFOs or unidentified aerial phenomena.

  • p. 18 …Questions are asked about the role of Quebec in Canadian national politics, the political tactics of…
  • p. 19 …because the manipulation of the environment is a fre- quently used tactic to advance particular ethnoterrito…
  • p. 39 …the justification for current demands on both sides. ‘ The Hungarians saw the Czech majority as advanced…
  • p. 58 …Despite the current difficulties with the European Monetary Regime (ERM) and the post—Maastricht negotiations, the…
  • p. 60 …the opening up of Europe to democratic ideals and representative politics, which follows the advance of…
  • p. 62 …sectors of the advanced capitalist world economy. In light of the new immigration, the stereotyping of…
  • p. 97 …and other non-Indian groups to advance common interests. The objectives of newly emerging Indian militancy…
  • p. 111 …has been advanced that could result in the separation of the two peoples, the Arab-Israeli…
  • p. 124 …especially the Uighur, Kazakh, Tajik, and Hui; Korean (the most educated and economically advanced nationality in…
  • p. 130 …As Christianity advances, both in the mountains and also in distinct urban and lowland mainstream communi…
  • p. 132 …the moun- tains of Xieng Khuang and Nam Thain northern Laos, Communist forces consistently advanced, supplied…
  • p. 138 …sought to advance their interests by a wide variety of means. These include the formation and…
  • p. 140 …It also notes the means by which ethnic groups seek to advance their interests and by…
  • p. 144 …more advanced than those previously ruled by the less progressive princes, such‘ as the Nizam of…
  • p. 161 …the demographic com- munity, and sometimes “corrections” are advanced by demographers outside the country. The only…
  • p. 182 …Brunn, “Future of the Nation State System,” Political Geography: Recent Advances and Future V. A. Kolosov…
  • p. 191 …any- where threaten stability everywhere, including the most advanced West European democracies. What happens in Central…
Approved for Release: 2018/06/01 C00123268
Reaction by Members of Nontitular Groups to
Rising Territorial Nationalism
Acceptance and Accommodation
A certain segment of the nontitular population that
was ethnically marginal was undergoing process of
acculturation and assimilation either with the titular
nation or with the local Russian population. For the
most part, these were nontitular people who had lived
outside their homelands for several generations and
whose ancestors had moved from their homeland
before nationalization processes had begun (Kaiser
1994). Of this acculturating/assimilating segment of
the nontitular population, those who are becoming
acculturated to the indigenous nation will accept, and
even promote, the new ethnic reality if they are
accepted by the titular nation. On the other hand, those
undergoing a process of Russification may respond as
the local Russian population does. Conversely, the
process of Russification itself may be reversed. For
example, children with Russian and Ukrainian parents
who claimed to be Russians in the past may prefer to
identify themselves as Ukrainians, particularly in
states where titular nationalism is directed against the
local Russians (for instance, in Latvia and Estonia).
Beyond this ethnically marginal population, there is
also a segment of the nontiwlar population that has
lived in the same republic and locality for generations
and has developed a strong sense of homeland (see
table 3). Several indicators of acceptance have
become apparent, particularly for the Russians living
in the non-Russian successor states. For example, a
relatively high percentage of Russians favored the
independence of the republics they lived in and voted
for independence-oriented parties, and a relatively
high percentage of Russians also identified Estonia as
their homeland (Drobizheva 1991). Surveys of Rus-
sian interethnic attitudes tended to show a willingness
to remain in the newly independent states, at least
immediately after independence. It may appear
counter-intuitive, but the Russian reaction to the new
ethno-political realities in the successor states appears
more accommodative than resistant thus far; this may
reflect the limited degree of Russian national con-
sciousness and nationalism. The republics where Rus-
sians comprised the highest proportion of nontitular
population are those without violent ethnic conflict.
Table 3 Percent
Population Born in the Republic of
Current Residence, 1989
Republic Titular Russians Non-
,
Russians
67.5
66.9
72.1
82.4
63.5
76.4
87.3
79.9
89.1
87.9
56.7
42.2
52.0
55.0
66.6
59.1
48.5
52.0
48.3
65.5
Uluaine
Belarus
Moldova
Uzbekistan
Kazakhstan
Kyrgyzstan
Tajikistan
Turkmenistan
Zieorgia
Azerbaijan
Armenia
Lithuania
9
Latvia
96.4
97.6
98.1
98.2
95.1
98.5
98.5
98.9
98.8
96.7
78.4 26.4 82.9
97.8 49.7 66.0 _
7 96.9 54.7 35.9
Estonia
*2
95.6 42.9 23.6
In successor states that have experienced violent conflict:
9
bssetians Abkhazians
Georgia 97.1 98.3
Armenians
Azerbaijan 94.0
K
Azeris
Armenia 91.2
Gagauz Ukrainians
Moldova 96.0 67.0
Uzbeks
Kyrgyzstan 93.8 _
Source: Goskomstat SSSR, ltogi Vsesoiuznoi Perepisi Naseleniia
1989 Goda, Volume 12, (Minneapolis: East View Publications,
1993).
However, acceptance and accommodation are also
dependent on the behavior of the titular nationalists. In
the case of Estonia, nationalists seeking to reduce the
Russian presence have alienated Russians who had
behaved as Estonian patriots. A similar situation
occurred in Latvia. Under these conditions, Russians
are unlikely to remain accommodative of titular
nationalism. Russian opposition is on the rise in the
Baltic states, as well zis in Kazakstan—-two regions
where Russian acceptance and accommodations were
dominant through 1992.
66
Approved for Release: 2018/06/01 C00123268

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FOIA release, from the cia-readingroom collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is above. 205 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.