Documents / FOIA release
This Central Intelligence Agency conference report, numbered RTT 95-10039 and dated October 1995, presents the proceedings of a conference held 30 September to 1 October 1993. The CIA's Geographic Resources Division sponsored the conference. In it, academic geographers, anthropologists and US Government officials examined ethnic conflict by region, covering Eastern Europe, the former Soviet Union, Africa, Latin America, the Middle East, Asia and South Asia. The report also discusses what these conflicts mean for US policy. It does not deal with UFOs or unidentified aerial phenomena.
“Terry”13 pages
Approved for Release: 2018/06/01 C00123268 Summary of Discussion Discussant: Thomas Poulsen Professor Wixman has laid out both in the paper that he wrote and in summary presentation some of the key elements that explain the Bosnian situation. I would like to underscore a few of them. The first element has to do with the Serbian justification for their actions. A concept that is helpful in explaining the Serbian posi- tion is that of iconography, which was coined a num- ber of years ago by the geographer Jean Gottman. Gottman defined iconography as the sum total of the perceptions of history, national symbols, and trivia that go to segregate one nation from another. According to Serbian iconography, they are a heroic people. The Serbs believe that they saved Europe from the Muslim hordes. They also believe that Yugosla- via—the Yugoslavia created in l918—was their nation-state and that it was their rightful prize because they had won World War I, which was just a continua- tion of their long defense of Europe. This perception can help to explain why the Serbs still see themselves as victims in the current conflict when most outside observers see them as the aggressors. The Serbs also believe that their homeland was Kos- ovo, a belief derived from the fact that they suffered their greatest defeat in the Battle of Kosovo in 1389, although Dr. Wixman can convincingly argue that this belief is not based on fact. He could cite an examina- tion of place names and a number of other features that cast doubt on the Serbian assertion. But such arguments would not change Serbian beliefs. All justi- fications are real to the justifiers, and in the case of the Serbs—as with most people/—it’s not what really hap- pens that counts, but what people believe happened. The Serbs were wrong in trying to maintain control of all of Yugoslavia. They are wrong now in trying to maintain control of all of Boshia and Herzegovina. I still think they have pretensions to the rest. Another point that Dr. Wixman brought up that I would like to comment on is that of the role of emi- gres in defining national identity. There are some who would attribute the Slovak separatism that led to the demise of the Czechoslovakian state as much to the effort of Americans of Slovak ancestry who returned after the fall of Communism with images and feelings of the 1920s and the 1930s as to any real problems in the region. The same can be said, perhaps, for some of the stronger original aspects of Croatian nationalism. However, many Croatians who were content to live in Yugoslavia and be proud of their Roman Catholic eth- nic heritage became Croatian nationalists as a reaction to Serbian action. My last point deals with the issue of core and periph- ery. It has been suggested that, in looking at the inten- sity of national feelings, we should consider core regions and intellectuals. Certainly—based on my experience—for an extended period of time those in Croatia who promoted a sense of difference and the need to get Croatian “rights” somehow satisfied were the professors, the schoolteachers, and the intellectu- als. But in addition to students, those who were most motivated to obtain such rights were not the people of the core area but were, in fact, the people in the border regions. This is a point that Dr. Wixman also made. In Croatia, for example, the strongest members of the Ustasha, the Croatian nationalist party during World War II, did not come from Zagreb but from the outer periphery, particularly in eastern Slavonia adjacent to the Serbian region. There, they had been challenged in their Croatian identity by living with Serbs. To use a more local example, during my lifetime, one could find “I20-percent Americans” in the Canal Zone more frequently than in the state of Oregon. General Discussion QUESTION: Professor Wixman, could you discuss the origin of the Muslim population in the Sandzak? DR. VVIXMAN: The origin of the Muslim people is the same as that of the Muslim peoples of Bulgaria (Pomaks), Macedonia (Torbesi), Bosnia and Heroe- govina (Muslimani), Albania, and Serbia, including the Sandzak. When the Turks came into the Balkans a major conversion of local populations occured. Most 39 Approved for Release: 2018/06/01 C00123268
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FOIA release, from the cia-readingroom collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is above. 205 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.