(Estimated Pub Date) the Challenge of Ethnic Conflict to National and International Order in the 1990S: Geographic Perspectives- October 1995

Approved for Release: 2018/06/01 C00123268
and 2) the implications for Turkey and the Middle
East. A possible scenario is presented at the end of
this presentation to illustrate the magnitude that these
events may take. '
Regardless of actual motive in not aiding the Bosnian
Muslims or the Croats, the West has created a new sit-
uation throughout the region. Had the United States
and its European allies come to the rescue of the
newly established Croatian and Bosnian nations when
they were invaded by the Serbs, a clear message
would have been sent that the Western countries sup-
ported democratic multinational states in the newly
forming countries in Eastern Europe. Many of these
countries, as fledgling democracies, are struggling
with situations of multiculturalism and of having large
and influential ethnic minorities. By not supporting
such ideas in Croatia and Bosnia, the opposite mes-
sage was sent.
On the one hand, it was clear by implication that the
West would not interfere in the intemal matters of
these states regarding ethnic issues and, on the other,
that ethnic cleansing and brutality were to be only ver-
bally censored. This leads to two problems regarding
ethnic stability in the region. One is the reaction of
countries to their ethnic minorities that they perceive
to be problematic. The other is to actions of states
fearing outside aggression in the guise of defending
coethnics in their states.
In the first case we have indicated to Russia that, if it
should so desire to reincorporate the Baltic states,
Ukraine, or Kazakhstan on the pretext of defending
the ethnic Russians in those territories, then the West
is unconcemed. This may add fuel to the existing Rus-
sian nationalist groups that demand the return of those
lands because: 1) they have ethnic Russians living
there who need to be protected, therefore these lands
should be under Russian control; and 2) lands once
under the Russian people must always be part of
Mother Russia. Similarly, Hungarian nationalists can
use the same argument to demand the retum of Vojvo-
dina and parts of Slovakia and Romania. If it is all
right for Serbs to invade and ethnically cleanse in the
name of protecting Serbs in these other regions, then
why not allow Hungarians, Romanians, Bulgarians, or
any number of other peoples to readjust national bor-
ders or protect ethnic minorities in other states?
The inaction on the part of the West to the plight of
Muslims and Croats in former Yugoslavia may open a
Pandora's box by promoting, rather than inhibiting,
ethnic nationalism. A green light has been given in
regions in which the fires of nationalism were already
rising as a result of their newfound freedom. In all
cases of decolonization, ethnic nationalism rises in the
newly created state. This often results in a demand
that the colonizer go home. Russians and Serbs today
are victims of such policies of decolonization, as were
the English, French, Germans, and others in lands for-
merly controlled by them.
When nothing was done to stop or punish the Serbs for
their outrageous behavior, the message was also sent to
nations that they better get rid of problematic minorities
now rather than risk intervention from the outside.
Romanians, Serbs, and Slovaks may perceive the Hun-
garian minorities as a greater threat because the Hun-
garian nationalists in Hungary may try to use the
existence of Hungarian colonies in neighboring coun-
tries as a pretext to change the borders. Similarly, Esto-
nians and Latvians will fear even more so the existence
of a large Russian population if the West has made it
clear that in principle it is all right for Russia to liberate
their people-—the Russians-—in Latvia and Estonia.
Estonian and Latvian nationalists may feel an even
greater urgency to induce the Russians to leave, so as to
minimize their chances of losing their independence.
If the United States and its allies do nothing to stop the
Serbs in their nationalist drive to ethnically cleanse
Bosnia and to incorporate other parts of the former
Yugoslavia, then why should the Serbs not do the
same in Kosovo and Vojvodina? If the West did noth-
ing in those cases, it most certainly is not going to do
any more over Kosovo. We have thus promoted more
Serbian aggression as well as paved the way for possi-
ble Hungarian, Romanian, Russian, Slovak, Estonian,
Albanian, or other acts of ethnic violence against other
nations and peoples.
Had the Serbs been stopped and punished (as the Ger-
mans were during World War H), a clear message
would have been sent that we do not accept undemo-
cratic behavior. Would it not be better to send the
message that multinational policies are what the West
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Approved for Release: 2018/06/01 C00123268