Documents / FOIA release

(Estimated Pub Date) the Challenge of Ethnic Conflict to National and International Order in the 1990S: Geographic Perspectives- October 1995

Central Intelligence Agency · 1995-10-01 · 205 pages · text from the file's own layer

This Central Intelligence Agency conference report, numbered RTT 95-10039 and dated October 1995, presents the proceedings of a conference held 30 September to 1 October 1993. The CIA's Geographic Resources Division sponsored the conference. In it, academic geographers, anthropologists and US Government officials examined ethnic conflict by region, covering Eastern Europe, the former Soviet Union, Africa, Latin America, the Middle East, Asia and South Asia. The report also discusses what these conflicts mean for US policy. It does not deal with UFOs or unidentified aerial phenomena.

  • p. 50 …For example, Muslim Serbs and Muslim Croats never defined them- selves as a people. They never…
  • p. 51 …I think that’s very crucial to under- standing why the Albanians never claimed Kosovo. Of…
  • p. 62 …be taught as a second foreign language, never as the first, and d_) less information and…
  • p. 78 …It never was. It might be useful, instead, to view the Soviet Union as a colonial…
  • p. 91 …As such, the ability of states to get from their people what they want has never…
  • p. 92 …The peoples of Africa never chose what their bound- aries should be—they were imposed by…
  • p. 93 …I never would have sent them in the first place. I thought our job was to…
  • p. 109 …Most of the provisions of this agreement were never imple- mented, and Kurdish autononiy became a…
  • p. 110 …those remaining in Lebanon, that prospect was never accepted by Muslims. The absence of believable data…
  • p. 112 …the vast majority of them—who have never known democracy. Other hopes can be enter- tained…
  • p. 114 …But in this region we can never say never, as evi- denced by the recent gasp…
  • p. 116 …Although Sovietologists could never have predicted the rapid events that dismantled the USSR at the beginning…
  • p. 119 …The Chinese, in my opinion,‘ never take China for granted, culturally, politically, or otherwise. This is…
  • p. 120 …What is going on here? National identities, although imagined, are never arbi- trary but arise in…
  • p. 121 …be one reason why these categories have never been challenged. The very Confucian practice of the…
  • p. 123 …These ethnic identities are “imagined” in Ben Ander- son’s (1983) terms, but they are never…
  • p. 133 …Inter- vention in the cause of the exacerbation of ethnic conflict should never be justified. Intervention…
  • p. 141 …Sociocultural identities in South Asia have never been fixed. The corporate mobility of particular groups, some…
  • p. 147 …Although never posing a serious challenge to Congress, the Mahasabha was particularly influential in the period…
  • p. 157 …were always moderate and that the extremists never represented the Sikh rank and file. One fundamental…
  • p. 166 …These are the people who have never had any form of internationally recognized status and who…
  • p. 169 …ways to enter as illegal immigrants and never get counted. 1 I Another important point to…
  • p. 177 …The -French nation never managed to incorpo- rate the adjacent French-speaking Belgian Walloons or the…
  • p. 186 …The reason Armenians still hate Turks is that there has never been reconciliation. Similarly there will…
  • p. 204 …You are never going to have total agreement on mov- ing boundaries. In fact, hundreds of…
Approved for Release: 2018/06/01 C00123268
Summary of Discussion
General Discussion
QUESTION: In your studies of conflict resolution,
can you give us some examples of effective outside
intervention into situations of aggressive ethnic
nationalism. The only good example I can think of is
the tremendous commitment that was necessary to
stop Nazi Germany, an aggressive ethnic nationalistic
state. These kinds of examples are important as we
think about getting into the situation in Bosnia.
DR. HINKLE: My field is microstates, and I can tell
you it worked pretty well in Grenada. But I take your
point. That is why I think that the emphasis really
should be on prevention, not intervention. That way,
you can act more effectively at lower cost and not be
in the position where you are dealing with interven-
tion.
Imagine if Saddam I-Iusayn had actually succeeded.
Twenty years from now, he would have effective con-
trol of 45 percent of the world's oil reserves and
would be industriously working to build nuclear
weapons and other weapons of mass destruction. If we
had the foresight in 1958 to act to facilitate a demo-
cratic transition in Iraq, however, we would not have
needed the level of resources we used in Desert Storm,
and the world might be a happier place. Even in
Grenada, if we just had the foresight to spend a couple
hundred thousand dollars to preempt the revolution of
1979, we would have saved 108 American casualties
in 1983. ' ‘
QUESTION: When there was a bipolar world, it was
fairly easy to identify the strategic interests of the
United States and the Soviet Union. How would the
United States feel in regard to Russia resolving ethnic
conflict in the former Soviet Union.
DR. GUNDERSEN: We view the issue of conflict and
peacekeeping in the former Soviet Union from the
outlook of preventive diplomacy. We do not want to
see a reenactment of the old view that there is a sphere
of influence of Russia over the Soviet Union. As long
as Russia’s involvement in its former periphery is
mandated by an intemational body—be it the UN or
the Conference on Security and Cooperation in
Europe—and as long as certain rules are followed and
the interests of all the parties are taken into account,
we are not, in principal, opposed to Russian involve-
ment. '
We also want to contain any ethnic difficulties before
they spill over. In Tajikistan, more people are being
killed every day than in Bosnia. We do not hear about
it because CNN is not there, but certainly there are
Iranian, Chinese, Turkish, and Russian interests in
Tajikistan, so we cannot ignore the situation there. I
think we should be a little more involved in preventive
diplomacy there. We have limited funds, however, so
it is difficult going between ends and means.
186
Approved for Release: 2018/06/01 C00123268

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FOIA release, from the cia-readingroom collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is under it. 205 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.