Documents / FOIA release

(Estimated Pub Date) the Challenge of Ethnic Conflict to National and International Order in the 1990S: Geographic Perspectives- October 1995

Central Intelligence Agency · 1995-10-01 · 205 pages · text from the file's own layer

This Central Intelligence Agency conference report, numbered RTT 95-10039 and dated October 1995, presents the proceedings of a conference held 30 September to 1 October 1993. The CIA's Geographic Resources Division sponsored the conference. In it, academic geographers, anthropologists and US Government officials examined ethnic conflict by region, covering Eastern Europe, the former Soviet Union, Africa, Latin America, the Middle East, Asia and South Asia. The report also discusses what these conflicts mean for US policy. It does not deal with UFOs or unidentified aerial phenomena.

  • p. 50 …For example, Muslim Serbs and Muslim Croats never defined them- selves as a people. They never…
  • p. 51 …I think that’s very crucial to under- standing why the Albanians never claimed Kosovo. Of…
  • p. 62 …be taught as a second foreign language, never as the first, and d_) less information and…
  • p. 78 …It never was. It might be useful, instead, to view the Soviet Union as a colonial…
  • p. 91 …As such, the ability of states to get from their people what they want has never…
  • p. 92 …The peoples of Africa never chose what their bound- aries should be—they were imposed by…
  • p. 93 …I never would have sent them in the first place. I thought our job was to…
  • p. 109 …Most of the provisions of this agreement were never imple- mented, and Kurdish autononiy became a…
  • p. 110 …those remaining in Lebanon, that prospect was never accepted by Muslims. The absence of believable data…
  • p. 112 …the vast majority of them—who have never known democracy. Other hopes can be enter- tained…
  • p. 114 …But in this region we can never say never, as evi- denced by the recent gasp…
  • p. 116 …Although Sovietologists could never have predicted the rapid events that dismantled the USSR at the beginning…
  • p. 119 …The Chinese, in my opinion,‘ never take China for granted, culturally, politically, or otherwise. This is…
  • p. 120 …What is going on here? National identities, although imagined, are never arbi- trary but arise in…
  • p. 121 …be one reason why these categories have never been challenged. The very Confucian practice of the…
  • p. 123 …These ethnic identities are “imagined” in Ben Ander- son’s (1983) terms, but they are never…
  • p. 133 …Inter- vention in the cause of the exacerbation of ethnic conflict should never be justified. Intervention…
  • p. 141 …Sociocultural identities in South Asia have never been fixed. The corporate mobility of particular groups, some…
  • p. 147 …Although never posing a serious challenge to Congress, the Mahasabha was particularly influential in the period…
  • p. 157 …were always moderate and that the extremists never represented the Sikh rank and file. One fundamental…
  • p. 166 …These are the people who have never had any form of internationally recognized status and who…
  • p. 169 …ways to enter as illegal immigrants and never get counted. 1 I Another important point to…
  • p. 177 …The -French nation never managed to incorpo- rate the adjacent French-speaking Belgian Walloons or the…
  • p. 186 …The reason Armenians still hate Turks is that there has never been reconciliation. Similarly there will…
  • p. 204 …You are never going to have total agreement on mov- ing boundaries. In fact, hundreds of…
Approved for Release: 2018/06/01 C00123268
still a dangerous place and that only one institution
has the operational capabilities and habits of coopera-
tion to preserve peace and stability on the Continent in
the post—Cold War era: NATO.
To accomplish this mission, however, NATO must
transform itself from an Alliance based on collective
defense against an identifiable threat into an Alliance
committed to projecting democracy, stability, and
crisis management throughout the Continent. This
cannot be done without engaging the nations to the
East. The real and potential hotspots in Europe all lie
in this area. If NATO does not deal with these nations,
it will become increasingly irrelevant—a closed,
chummy club without a mission or a message. Any
new security structure, therefore, must be inclusive
rather than exclusive; it should not lead to the redivi-
sion of Europe into blocs.
Over time, therefore, NATO must be open to new
members, largely to the East but also to include the
neutral and nonaligned states of Europe. This
approach—which has been called the “Partnership for
Peace” program—would provide a framework within
the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC) for
enhanced political and military cooperation. Under
this rubric the militaries of East and West would plan,
train, and exercise together. Active cooperation in this
partnership could lay the foundation for full NATO
membership. In short, future expansion should be evo-
lutionary, inclusive, and aimed at enhancing the stabil-
ity of Europe.
Trade, Not Aid
While the Soviet empire was fragmenting, West Euro-
pean officials smugly maintained that they had
resolved their remaining differences at Maastricht. A
united and prosperous European Community, they
believed, could be protected from the economic and
political instability in the East. The euphoria was short
lived. Many Europeans now conclude the Maastricht
Treaty was drafted “too soon and too quickly.” Faced
with depressed economies and weak govemments,
European polities, like their American brethren, seek
national solutions to global problems. Westem Europe
threatens to define itself and its world role narrowly.
Neither parochial nor EC-only solutions, however,
address the unavoidable fact that the West cannot
insulate itself from economic decline, ethnic strife,
and political instability in the East. Their fates are
intertwined. Ethnic minorities have perhaps most at
stake in a stable and prosperous Europe. In times of
recession, populist leaders seek scapegoats, most
often ethnic minorities. Such conditions create eco-
nomic refugees throughout Europe.
While Europeans must ultimately determine their own
economic architecture, Americans have a large stake
in the outcome. A successful Uruguay Round of the
world trade talks, to a large degree, hinges on the ame-
nable conclusion of inter-European and US-EC nego-
tiations. It is in our mutual interest, therefore, to
decrease trade barriers and to increase market access
to our respective markets.
European economic integration is of particular interest
to the countries of Central and Eastern Europe and the
NIS. Without an outlet for their products, many of the
leaders of these countries will be tempted to return to
the false stability and the failed statist policies of the
past. Just as in the security field, American policy-
makers should seek to extend the zone of economic
prosperity eastward. We should encourage the expan-
sion of the EC eastward. We should welcome the
greater integration of the former East Bloc into the
global trading system. We should lower or eliminate
inefficient subsidies. In short, trade, not aid, is the best
guarantee for a prosperous Europe.
CSCE: Conscience of Europe
The CSCE has recently been called the conscience of
Europe. European statesmen from Vacel Havel to
Margaret Thatcher to Andrey Sakharov have credited
the 1975 Helsinki Final Act, the founding document
of CSCE, for providing the intellectual basis for the
demise of Communism. The CSCE has not always
received such good press. In 1975 the Soviet leader-
ship believed that the Final Act legitimized the Soviet
presence in Europe; that is, a sphere of influence.
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Approved for Release: 2018/06/01 C00123268

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FOIA release, from the cia-readingroom collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is under it. 205 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.