(Estimated Pub Date) the Challenge of Ethnic Conflict to National and International Order in the 1990S: Geographic Perspectives- October 1995

Approved for Release: 2018/06/01 C00123268
still a dangerous place and that only one institution
has the operational capabilities and habits of coopera-
tion to preserve peace and stability on the Continent in
the post—Cold War era: NATO.
To accomplish this mission, however, NATO must
transform itself from an Alliance based on collective
defense against an identifiable threat into an Alliance
committed to projecting democracy, stability, and
crisis management throughout the Continent. This
cannot be done without engaging the nations to the
East. The real and potential hotspots in Europe all lie
in this area. If NATO does not deal with these nations,
it will become increasingly irrelevant—a closed,
chummy club without a mission or a message. Any
new security structure, therefore, must be inclusive
rather than exclusive; it should not lead to the redivi-
sion of Europe into blocs.
Over time, therefore, NATO must be open to new
members, largely to the East but also to include the
neutral and nonaligned states of Europe. This
approach—which has been called the “Partnership for
Peace” program—would provide a framework within
the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC) for
enhanced political and military cooperation. Under
this rubric the militaries of East and West would plan,
train, and exercise together. Active cooperation in this
partnership could lay the foundation for full NATO
membership. In short, future expansion should be evo-
lutionary, inclusive, and aimed at enhancing the stabil-
ity of Europe.
Trade, Not Aid
While the Soviet empire was fragmenting, West Euro-
pean officials smugly maintained that they had
resolved their remaining differences at Maastricht. A
united and prosperous European Community, they
believed, could be protected from the economic and
political instability in the East. The euphoria was short
lived. Many Europeans now conclude the Maastricht
Treaty was drafted “too soon and too quickly.” Faced
with depressed economies and weak govemments,
European polities, like their American brethren, seek
national solutions to global problems. Westem Europe
threatens to define itself and its world role narrowly.
Neither parochial nor EC-only solutions, however,
address the unavoidable fact that the West cannot
insulate itself from economic decline, ethnic strife,
and political instability in the East. Their fates are
intertwined. Ethnic minorities have perhaps most at
stake in a stable and prosperous Europe. In times of
recession, populist leaders seek scapegoats, most
often ethnic minorities. Such conditions create eco-
nomic refugees throughout Europe.
While Europeans must ultimately determine their own
economic architecture, Americans have a large stake
in the outcome. A successful Uruguay Round of the
world trade talks, to a large degree, hinges on the ame-
nable conclusion of inter-European and US-EC nego-
tiations. It is in our mutual interest, therefore, to
decrease trade barriers and to increase market access
to our respective markets.
European economic integration is of particular interest
to the countries of Central and Eastern Europe and the
NIS. Without an outlet for their products, many of the
leaders of these countries will be tempted to return to
the false stability and the failed statist policies of the
past. Just as in the security field, American policy-
makers should seek to extend the zone of economic
prosperity eastward. We should encourage the expan-
sion of the EC eastward. We should welcome the
greater integration of the former East Bloc into the
global trading system. We should lower or eliminate
inefficient subsidies. In short, trade, not aid, is the best
guarantee for a prosperous Europe.
CSCE: Conscience of Europe
The CSCE has recently been called the conscience of
Europe. European statesmen from Vacel Havel to
Margaret Thatcher to Andrey Sakharov have credited
the 1975 Helsinki Final Act, the founding document
of CSCE, for providing the intellectual basis for the
demise of Communism. The CSCE has not always
received such good press. In 1975 the Soviet leader-
ship believed that the Final Act legitimized the Soviet
presence in Europe; that is, a sphere of influence.
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Approved for Release: 2018/06/01 C00123268