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(Estimated Pub Date) the Challenge of Ethnic Conflict to National and International Order in the 1990S: Geographic Perspectives- October 1995

Central Intelligence Agency · 1995-10-01 · 205 pages · text from the file's own layer

This Central Intelligence Agency conference report, numbered RTT 95-10039 and dated October 1995, presents the proceedings of a conference held 30 September to 1 October 1993. The CIA's Geographic Resources Division sponsored the conference. In it, academic geographers, anthropologists and US Government officials examined ethnic conflict by region, covering Eastern Europe, the former Soviet Union, Africa, Latin America, the Middle East, Asia and South Asia. The report also discusses what these conflicts mean for US policy. It does not deal with UFOs or unidentified aerial phenomena.

  • p. 50 …For example, Muslim Serbs and Muslim Croats never defined them- selves as a people. They never…
  • p. 51 …I think that’s very crucial to under- standing why the Albanians never claimed Kosovo. Of…
  • p. 62 …be taught as a second foreign language, never as the first, and d_) less information and…
  • p. 78 …It never was. It might be useful, instead, to view the Soviet Union as a colonial…
  • p. 91 …As such, the ability of states to get from their people what they want has never…
  • p. 92 …The peoples of Africa never chose what their bound- aries should be—they were imposed by…
  • p. 93 …I never would have sent them in the first place. I thought our job was to…
  • p. 109 …Most of the provisions of this agreement were never imple- mented, and Kurdish autononiy became a…
  • p. 110 …those remaining in Lebanon, that prospect was never accepted by Muslims. The absence of believable data…
  • p. 112 …the vast majority of them—who have never known democracy. Other hopes can be enter- tained…
  • p. 114 …But in this region we can never say never, as evi- denced by the recent gasp…
  • p. 116 …Although Sovietologists could never have predicted the rapid events that dismantled the USSR at the beginning…
  • p. 119 …The Chinese, in my opinion,‘ never take China for granted, culturally, politically, or otherwise. This is…
  • p. 120 …What is going on here? National identities, although imagined, are never arbi- trary but arise in…
  • p. 121 …be one reason why these categories have never been challenged. The very Confucian practice of the…
  • p. 123 …These ethnic identities are “imagined” in Ben Ander- son’s (1983) terms, but they are never…
  • p. 133 …Inter- vention in the cause of the exacerbation of ethnic conflict should never be justified. Intervention…
  • p. 141 …Sociocultural identities in South Asia have never been fixed. The corporate mobility of particular groups, some…
  • p. 147 …Although never posing a serious challenge to Congress, the Mahasabha was particularly influential in the period…
  • p. 157 …were always moderate and that the extremists never represented the Sikh rank and file. One fundamental…
  • p. 166 …These are the people who have never had any form of internationally recognized status and who…
  • p. 169 …ways to enter as illegal immigrants and never get counted. 1 I Another important point to…
  • p. 177 …The -French nation never managed to incorpo- rate the adjacent French-speaking Belgian Walloons or the…
  • p. 186 …The reason Armenians still hate Turks is that there has never been reconciliation. Similarly there will…
  • p. 204 …You are never going to have total agreement on mov- ing boundaries. In fact, hundreds of…
Approved for Release: 2018/06/01 C00123268
The Demographic Backdrop to
Ethnic Conflict: A Geographic
Overview
Gary Fpller
Professor of Geography and
Population‘ Studies
University of Hawaii
Introduction
Following the breakup of the fonner Soviet Union,
Senator Daniel Patrick Moyriihan strongly criticized
US intelligence estimates that, he alleged, had ignored
Soviet demographic and health statistics. Moynihan
argued that any society that exhibited the symptoms of
the USSR-—which included rising overall mortality
and a high incidence of alcoh:olism—-could not be a
legitimate economic or military threat to the United
States. The criticism is unfair in one sense, since it
does not require national health or sobriety to launch
missiles. Nevertheless, Moynihan’s observation about
the role of demographic statistics in intelligence anal-
ysis is insightful. i
States sometimes go to great _lengths to disguise data
about their economies and societies, usually with the
motive of misleading their enemies (and perhaps their
own citizens as well). More commonly, however,
accurate data are elusive because they are difficult and
expensive to collect, analyze, and interpret. I once
spent several months visitinggand collecting data from
remote family planning clinics in Chile, and I was
struck with how different thesituation at the clinics
was compared with the official reports in Santiago.
My experience is highly typical, I think, and is shared
by most who have done field research.
5
Demographic data are almostfalways the best data that
are available for a society. This is not to say that they
are good; indeed, they are often very poor. I am only
here advancing a comparative judgment. Govern-
ments collecting demographic data (whether censuses,
vital registers, or surveys) can call upon an impressive
body of international experience and knowledge con-
cerning the planning, execution, inteipretation, and
151
adjustment of demographic data. Most such data,
moreover, are not seen as threatening by govemments.
Certainly there are cases where certain population
information is viewed as terribly dangerous (Lebanon
or Iraq’s religious compositions, for example), but,
even when this is the case, other demographic data
unrelated to policymakers’ phobias may be unaf-
fected. Finally, censuses have to be conducted openly.
Information about their quality and the nature of their
biases is widely circulated in the demographic com-
munity, and sometimes “corrections” are advanced by
demographers outside the country. The only effective
way to keep demographic data secret is not to collect
them.
Demographic Indicators of Instability
Consider also that certain demographic trends corre-
late highly with socioeconomic variables; were it not
for this fact, demographic transition would be an
arcane model of little interest to any but abstract theo-
rists. Thus, it requires only a small logical step to see
that socioeconomic data and trends (perhaps closely
guarded or disguised) are imbedded in demographic
data that are open and aboveboard. Hungary offers an
interesting example. As a former Warsaw Pact mem-
ber, Hungary was quite guarded in releasing social
and economic data, but its population data are among
the best in the world.
I do not mean to imply either that censuses ought to
replace electronic surveillance in the intelligence kit
bag or that demographic data can entirely compensate
for a lack of socioeconomic data. My point is that
population data are a rich vein that is not mined suffi-
ciently and that academic researchers and intelligence
analysts have the opportunity to use census data in
creative ways that give new insight into societal
trends. Perhaps because the data are easy to come by,
their value is not fully appreciated.
A comprehensive case for the value of the demo-
graphic perspective in assessing intelligence issues
would require more space than I have available. I hope
a few aspects of the “correlation” I mentioned earlier
will suffice.
Approved for Release: 2018/06/01 C00123268

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FOIA release, from the cia-readingroom collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is under it. 205 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.