(Estimated Pub Date) the Challenge of Ethnic Conflict to National and International Order in the 1990S: Geographic Perspectives- October 1995

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Approved for Release: 2018/06/01 C00123268
of community, but the sensed bonds of religion, I
would argue, were generally weaker, at least among
Hindus, than were those of caste.
The unification of India under the British and the
accelerating expansion, thereafter, of the transporta-
tion and communications network, literacy, the press,
and notions of democratic governance brought about a
number of important changes in the way that people
saw themselves and in their patterns of interaction.
While identification with and loyalty to one’s caste-
remained important, other social attributes became
increasingly salient as wider arenas of economic and
political interaction were established. New, more-or-
less Westernized commercial and bureaucratic elites
came into being. Although they were mainly Hindu,
these new elites drew also from other religious com-
munities and from many linguistic regions. In some
situations, especially after the creation of the Indian
National Congress in 1885, they formed the nucleus
for an emerging Panlndian, nontraditional, national-
ism. In other contexts, however, socially and cultur-
ally defined groups vied with one another for privilege
and power. Thus, in addition to their caste and reli-
gious identities, many Indians became increasingly
aware of regional attachments that were previously
only dimly sensed within areas dominated by a partic-
ular language or dialect. The range of politically rele-
vant primordial loyalties—-those that form the basis
for what we now recognize as ethnicity-—was
expanded accordingly. In a sense, then, we may say
that one’s identity-—orjati—-toiday means much more
than caste alone. ;
The British rulers recognized the latent potential for
disunity inherent in the social and cultural complexity
of the subcontinent, and they responded fitfully and
often grudgingly to Indian demands for greater control
over their own destinies. In each of a series of major
constitutional reforms, such as the Indian Councils
Act of 1909 and the Govemmeht of India Acts of
1919 and 1935, they acknowledged the claims of spe-
cific minorities to separate electorates to guarantee
some semblance of fair representation in the evolving
legislative apparatus. At first only the Muslim popula-
tion was accorded special recognition. Subsequently,
concomitant with an expanding franchise, elected
seats were reserved also for Sikhs, Indian Christians,
Anglo-Indians, Europeans, and Scheduled Castes as
well as for such special interests as Indian commerce
and industry, European commerce, landholders, labor,
and even women. Whether the course adopted was an
attempt to gradually establish a liberal representative
democracy or a cynical policy of “divide and con-
quer” depends on whose version of history one
chooses to believe. In any event, a policy of recogniz-
ing the en bloc claims of particular constituencies to a
share of the political pie was set firmly in place,
thereby reinforcing ethnic sensitivities.
The establishment of quotas remains a part of the
political modus operandi to this day, although the
rules for fixing quotas varied from one context to
another. Some quotas are in strict proportion to popu-
lation. Depressed groups—0fficially designated
“Scheduled Castes” and “Scheduled Tribes”——are
guaranteed certain numbers of seats in national and
state legislatures, of positions in various lower and
middle levels of govemment employment, and of
acceptances to institutions of higher education. Rules
of this type are institutionalized in the Constitutions of
India, Pakistan, and Bangladesh. Other informal quo-
tas for places on party tickets, for participation in state
and provincial ministries, or for a share of the eco-
nomic largess over which certain agencies of govern-
ment have control, are more flexible and situation-
specific. These informal quotas are often determined
by deals made by party bosses in response to promises
of support or various pressures by specific groups.
Institutionalized religious quotas are presently
unthinkable within the secular democracy of India, but
the Muslim voting bloc—roughly one-ninth of the
total Indian electorate and much more than that in sev-
eral regions—retains an informal claim to a share of
power. In Pakistan the small Ahmadiya sect, which
the Constitution has declared to be outside the pale of
Islam, has been allotted reserved seats in both the
national and provincial legislatures, as have other
minorities and women.
Sociocultural identities in South Asia have never been
fixed. The corporate mobility of particular groups,
some ascending and others descending in the local
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Approved for Release: 2018/06/01 C00123268