(Estimated Pub Date) the Challenge of Ethnic Conflict to National and International Order in the 1990S: Geographic Perspectives- October 1995

Approved for Release: 2018/06/01 C00123268
Camb0dia- Vietnam. Cambodia remains a cause for
major concern. Once the greatest of precolonial
nation-states in Southeast Asia, the kingdom of the
Khmer has been in decline for many centuries, victim-
ized by cohesive and stronger Thai and Vietnamese
forces and by an unusually fractious elite. The enmity
expressed by Cambodians toward their Vietnamese
neighbors courses deep and is widely shared among
the populace. The Cambodians feel that Vietnam is
determined to swallow up what remains of their cul-
ture and country—much as ancient Vietnam destroyed
the coastal kingdom of Champa in 1471 (Tarling,
1992; 156). In the past Cambodian demagogues have
manipulated such sentiments to their own ends.
Anti-Vietnamese pogroms have facilitated the careers
of Lon Nol and Pol Pot; anti-Vietnamese rhetoric has
been consistently employed during the recent UN-
supervised election campaign. At present, it seems as
if the long internal nightmare of Cambodia is coming
to an end. If things go wrong, however, violence
directed against the Vietnamese minority in Cambodia
and along the CambodianVietnamese border could
again arise.
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Laos-China. A final border area of some interest is
that which divides Laos and China. At present this
area is calm and hopefully will remain so. During the
Indochina conflict, China, the USSR, and the Pathet
Lao worked closely together. Despite the efforts of the
United States, aided by its tribal allies in the moun-
tains of Xieng Khuang and Nam Thain northern Laos,
Communist forces consistently advanced, supplied
overland by Chinese trucks. After 1975 Laos quickly
was drawn into Vietnam's political orbit. As a satellite
state hosting some 40,000 Vietnamese troops, Laos
after 1979 expressed the same hostility towards China
as did Vietnam. Vietnam responded by arming and
training highland rebels. Indeed, many tribal guerrillas
who formerly had fought for the United States now
rallied to a cause supported by Beijing. China's sup-
port for such movements has ceased, and currently
significant efforts are underway to develop a trade and
communications infrastructure that will link south-
west China to the sea through Laos and Vietnam.
Tribal rebels these days operate, as far as is known,
without the support of=any major govemment,
financed by opium sales and by fund transfers from
relatives in the United States. If the Vientiane govem-
ment demonstrates interest in assuring development
equity for the highlands, respects minority cultural
rights, and assures land title to upland farmers, the
Laos-China border area may become a new develop-
ment growth pole in the future. Failure to carefully
negotiate the mutual interests of the government in
Vientiane and minority highlands in the north could
ignite further conflict between the lowland Lao and
the Hmong, Mien, and Lao in this sensitive border
region.
Ideological Conflicts
Of the five Leninist regimes current functioning in
today’s world-—China, North Korea, Cuba, Laos, and
Vietnarn—two are situated in Southeast Asia. What-
ever the threat ofthe expansion of Communism may
have been in the past, it is certainly clear that this
threat does not exist in Southeast Asia today. Laos, a
workers’ state with precious few industrial workers,
generates most of its meager foreign income by sell-
ing electricity to Thailand. Overseeing the poorest,
least developed, most remote country in Southeast
Asia, the present and previous Lao administrations
have experienced considerable difficulty in governing
their highly diverse populations, much less in interfer-
ing in the affairs of other nations. Vietnam is clearly in
the process of reintegrating itself into the East Asian
economy. Vietnam is receiving considerable foreign
investment, manages its infrastructure with demon-
strable talent in the face of meager resources, and
shows every indication of an economic recovery from
the policy disasters of 15 years ago (Jamieson, 1993;
373). In sum, the end of ideology as a factor in
national conflict can clearly be perceived in Southeast
Asia today. But this situation hardly portends “the end
of history,” about which so much has been written in
recent years. Indeed, it is the burden of history, and
not of ideology, which has driven the ethnic enmities,
national disputes, and international conflicts that have
beset this region during the current century.
Conclusion
Given the expanse and complexity of the Southeast
Asian geographical region it would be impossible to
recount all the past, present, and possible ethnic
distinctions, rivalries, and disputes in this region. I
have mentioned a few areas ofconcem and noted that
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Approved for Release: 2018/06/01 C00123268