Documents / FOIA release

(Estimated Pub Date) the Challenge of Ethnic Conflict to National and International Order in the 1990S: Geographic Perspectives- October 1995

Central Intelligence Agency · 1995-10-01 · 205 pages · text from the file's own layer

This Central Intelligence Agency conference report, numbered RTT 95-10039 and dated October 1995, presents the proceedings of a conference held 30 September to 1 October 1993. The CIA's Geographic Resources Division sponsored the conference. In it, academic geographers, anthropologists and US Government officials examined ethnic conflict by region, covering Eastern Europe, the former Soviet Union, Africa, Latin America, the Middle East, Asia and South Asia. The report also discusses what these conflicts mean for US policy. It does not deal with UFOs or unidentified aerial phenomena.

  • p. 50 …For example, Muslim Serbs and Muslim Croats never defined them- selves as a people. They never…
  • p. 51 …I think that’s very crucial to under- standing why the Albanians never claimed Kosovo. Of…
  • p. 62 …be taught as a second foreign language, never as the first, and d_) less information and…
  • p. 78 …It never was. It might be useful, instead, to view the Soviet Union as a colonial…
  • p. 91 …As such, the ability of states to get from their people what they want has never…
  • p. 92 …The peoples of Africa never chose what their bound- aries should be—they were imposed by…
  • p. 93 …I never would have sent them in the first place. I thought our job was to…
  • p. 109 …Most of the provisions of this agreement were never imple- mented, and Kurdish autononiy became a…
  • p. 110 …those remaining in Lebanon, that prospect was never accepted by Muslims. The absence of believable data…
  • p. 112 …the vast majority of them—who have never known democracy. Other hopes can be enter- tained…
  • p. 114 …But in this region we can never say never, as evi- denced by the recent gasp…
  • p. 116 …Although Sovietologists could never have predicted the rapid events that dismantled the USSR at the beginning…
  • p. 119 …The Chinese, in my opinion,‘ never take China for granted, culturally, politically, or otherwise. This is…
  • p. 120 …What is going on here? National identities, although imagined, are never arbi- trary but arise in…
  • p. 121 …be one reason why these categories have never been challenged. The very Confucian practice of the…
  • p. 123 …These ethnic identities are “imagined” in Ben Ander- son’s (1983) terms, but they are never…
  • p. 133 …Inter- vention in the cause of the exacerbation of ethnic conflict should never be justified. Intervention…
  • p. 141 …Sociocultural identities in South Asia have never been fixed. The corporate mobility of particular groups, some…
  • p. 147 …Although never posing a serious challenge to Congress, the Mahasabha was particularly influential in the period…
  • p. 157 …were always moderate and that the extremists never represented the Sikh rank and file. One fundamental…
  • p. 166 …These are the people who have never had any form of internationally recognized status and who…
  • p. 169 …ways to enter as illegal immigrants and never get counted. 1 I Another important point to…
  • p. 177 …The -French nation never managed to incorpo- rate the adjacent French-speaking Belgian Walloons or the…
  • p. 186 …The reason Armenians still hate Turks is that there has never been reconciliation. Similarly there will…
  • p. 204 …You are never going to have total agreement on mov- ing boundaries. In fact, hundreds of…
Approved for Release: 2018/06/01 C00123268
In contrast to the largely homogeneous lowland irri-
gated-rice-tilling peoples, the mountain inhabitants
were fragmented into many small tribal groups. A
stability of economy and polity naturally emerges
from irrigated rice agriculture. By contrast, shifting
cultivation in the mountains normally dictated the
cyclical mobility of tribal peoples, offering as well
opportunities for new migrating groups to till South-
east Asian fields in the wake of the unyielding expan-
sion of Han populations in southem China. The
different languages, religions, socioeconomic adapta-
tions, and political loyalties of the lowlanders and
highlanders engendered tension and conflict even in
precolonial times.
Presently the frontier of the Southeast Asian mountain
hinterland seems to be in the ifinal stages of closing.
Until three decades ago, highland slash-and-bum cul-
tivators could always count on another forest or an
additional mountain swidden field to provide subsis-
tence sustenance in the wakeof the exhaustion of old
farming plots. Today, throughout Southeast Asia, pop-
ulation expansion, commercial exploitation of timber
and mineral reserves, and initiatives to conserve the
rainforest constra.in—if not absolutely deny—the tra-
ditional exploitation of the highland farming environ-
ment by minority tribal peoples. In the past
lowlanders were content to conduct barter trade with
upland tribal societies, secure in the knowledge that
the only constraint on the expansion of their irrigated
plains was the lack of available labor. Today the plains
have in many areas reached their absolute carrying
capacity. For the lowland rural poor and landless
laborers, survival strategies include migration to urban
areas or colonization of upland regions that have been
the historic preserve of minority cultivators. With
each passing decade the pressure on tribal peoples to
permanently settle, abandon their claims to wide
expanses of land, and assimilate to national culture
have intensified. Government population-transfer pro-
grams lend the legitimacy of state planning to the shift
of lowland populations to the uplands. Highlander
perceptions of second-class citizenship status (if such
citizenship is recognized at all) clearly pose the threat
of conflict. The role of major powers in the highlands
of Southeast Asia in the recent past clearly deserves at
least passing mention in the context of this confer-
ence. Colonial divide-and-rule policies, perhaps
121
refined earlier in other parts of the world, oftentimes
were articulated by the English in Burma, the Dutch in
Indonesia, and the French in Indochina in maintaining
the social and political control of majority lowland
peoples. Highland minorities oftentimes were given
strategically crucial roles to play in colonial armed
forces. Often such tribal groups were the first to be
weaned from traditional religion by Christian mission-
aries dispatched with official sanction from the metro-
pole.
No discussion of ethnic conflict in Southeast Asia
could proceed without direct reference to the conflict
in Indochina. In Laos the highland-lowland geo-
graphic division took on special significance. Here the
handful of French-trained Hmong soldiers were sub-
sequently nurtured by American operatives as the core
cadre of a large, secret army based at Long Chieng
(Hamilton-Merritt; 1993). For nearly l5 years this
superbly motivated, well-armed, amply supplied, and
professionally advised force struck as guerrilla units
along the Ho Chi Minh trail, fought a rear guard
action to try to hold territory in northem Laos, and
assisted in the rescue of downed US airmen. The
“secret army” consisted of not only Hmong but also of
Mien and Lahu peoples of the high mountains of
northern Laos. In the end their loyalty was not recip-
rocated. Some 250,000 highlanders who were aban-
doned in the spring of 1975 eventually fled their
native Laos, while untold numbers fell victim to eth-
nic reprisal inside Laos. Over the past 17 years, at
least 100,000 highland Laotians who qualified as
political refugees have resettled in the United States.
In Laos, low-intensity conflict has persisted to the
present, pitting highland rebels against the central
government.
Highland-lowland geographic distinctions articulated
in conflicts overland, political control, and ideology
are amply demonstrated by the example of Laos. The
fundamental question for the future is the role that
nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), multilateral
lending agencies, and national aid programs will play
toward ameliorating these conflicts. In the past,
national intelligence agencies have oftentimes pur-
posefully aggravated extant tensions, the better to win
Approved for Release: 2018/06/01 C00123268

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FOIA release, from the cia-readingroom collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is under it. 205 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.