(Estimated Pub Date) the Challenge of Ethnic Conflict to National and International Order in the 1990S: Geographic Perspectives- October 1995

. Approved for Release: 2018/06/01 C00123268
often alienate the majority, and in China this has led to
resentment and ethnic conflict in some areas. This is
particularly true for groups such as the Hui, Manchu,
She, and Zhuang, who closely, resemble the Han
majority in their areas. It has led to accusations that
these groups are faking ethnic identity in order to have
more children or receive special government assis-
tance (see my discussion of the “two-child I-Iui” Mus-
lims, Gladney: The Journal ofAsian Studies).
Popular culture should be monitored as an indication
of the rising importance of ethhic or cultural differ-
ence. In Beijing, whereas onlyia few years ago South-
erners and southem accents were pilloried and
stigmatized by many “crosstalk” comedians and enter-
tainers, Cantonese terms and accents are now highly
valued and affected. Canton, Shenzhen, and Hong
Kong songs, movies, clothing styles, and entertainers
are extremely popular throughout China, even though
they are frequently not understood. At the same time,
“ethnic art” that exoticizes, romanticizes, and often
eroticizes the minorities in Yunnan and Tibet, is
extremely popular inside and outside China, leading to
the founding of the Yunnan Art School (see Gladney:
Asian Visions of Authority: Religion and the Modern
States of East and Southeast Asia).
The ethnic makeup of “floating'populations” and other
labor groups should be examined, particularly as it
relates to large migrations of peoples and the growth
of ethnic economic niches. Dorothy Solinger in a
series of articles has documented the rising promi-
nence of “floating” migrant populations but has not
analyzed why it is that most of the groups are mem-
bers of certain ethnic sub-Han communities. For
example, almost all shoe repair‘ in China is dominated
by Zhejiangese from a certain county; child care
workers and domestics in Beijing almost all come
from one part of Anhui; the Subei people dominate
specific “unclean” occupations in Shanghai (see
Honig 1991); Cantonese now contract almost all of
their agricultural labor to Hunanese peasants; and,
until recently, the Uighur dominated the moneychang-
ing black market. .
117
The Taiwan aboriginal movement should be monitored
as to its impact on Republic of China policy and its
coverage in the People’s Republic of China media. The
outcome over this debate about indigenous peoples’
land rights, their desire for native language training,
and the need for cultural preservation will have serious
repercussions on both sides of the Taiwan Strait.
The military has been drastically overhauled since
questions were raised about regional loyalty during
the Tiananmen incident. Further attention should be
paid to the origins and cultures of the officers in
charge and of the forces under their commands.
China's military districts occupy important macrore~
gions that William Skinner (1965) once argued were
entirely separate focuses around which the rest of
China moved. Although China, unlike the USSR, has
not employed many “official” minorities in the mili-
tary, many commanders and their forces may have sig-
nificant local and regional attachments. Military
researchers have tended to dismiss these local and
regional differences because of certain assumptions
about Han and Chinese identity. The ethnic and cul-
tural makeup of the military may not have much influ-
ence on military decision making, nonetheless, it may
effect the relationship with the local populations, as
we saw briefly in Beijing.
In the mid-1980s, political scientists initiated a series
of studies and conferences under the rubric of “bring-
ing the state back in” (see Skocpol 1985), leading to a
stronger consideration of the role of the state in defin-
ing state-society relations. This was an added correc-
tive to earlier, particularist studies, which emphasized
microeconomic and community or individual-actor—
based approaches. However, in both approaches cul-
ture as a political force was somehow lost. As a politi-
cal and cultural anthropologist, I am arguing for the
necessity of bringing culture back into the debate, not
as a determining force in social relations but as an
important factor in understanding the options avail-
able to political actors in the field of social relations.
Approved for Release: 2018/06/01 C00123268