(Estimated Pub Date) the Challenge of Ethnic Conflict to National and International Order in the 1990S: Geographic Perspectives- October 1995

Approved for Release: 2018/06/01 C00123268
Now that the global map is most defined by the
nation-state, the peoples within must define them-
selves vis-a-vis the nation-state. E. K. Francis, in his
Interethnic Relations (1978); argued that the rise of
ethnic identities and interethnic conflict was a phe-
nomenon tied most directly to the nation-state. It is the
nation-state that takes upon itself the task of legislat-
ing identity. Empires were consumed more with rul-
ing, rather than legislating and identifying the peoples
under their spheres of influence. In the modern era, it
is often the nation-state apparatus itself with which
ethnic groups find themselves in opposition. By agree-
ing to articulate their identities along the contours
shaped by ethnic identification policies and censuses,
ethnic groups demonstrate their desire to form coali-
tions at the highest possible level in order to interact
as a powerful collectivity with the state apparatus.
These ethnic identities are “imagined” in Ben Ander-
son’s (1983) terms, but they are never arbitrary. They
form according to cultural, historical, and political
power oppositions and alliances. What we are wit-
nessing today with the end of the Cold War is the
moving down of oppositional alliances to levels that
now emphasize the importance of the politics of dif-
ference below the level of the Han. The opposition to
the West, to imperialism, and to the Japanese is no
longer a motivating force binding China together.
Ethnic Nationalism in China: Some Policy
Considerations
The increasing importance of playing the politics of
difference for personal and corporate gain out of
response to stigmatized identities, or just out of a
renewed sense of the meaningfulness of one’s history
in China, has important implications for how we
understand ethnic identity and the potential for con-
flict. Although this paper does not predict ethnic con-
flict along any predetermined lines, the argument here
is to suggest the importance of certain faultlines,
should fragmentation, most important at the center of
the state’s power structure, occur. The Uighur will
never become independent astlong as Beijing is in
firm control, but Beijing is increasingly dependent on
Canton, and, if Canton should make a move, many
Uighur would be only too glad to take advantage of
the situation. Analysis and policy decisions regarding
ethnic conflict in China should consider several issues,
which follow.
Cultural nationalism and ethnic difference should be
taken seriously. This is true not only among the “offi-
cial” minority nationalities, who are stigmatized or
empowered because of that designation, but also
among at least two other kinds of groups: applicant
groups and sub-Han groups.
Applicant groups are seeking or have sought to be rec-
ognized as “official” minority nationalities. Many of
these groups were not recognized in the 1940s and
1950s during the nationality identification programs,
and some have sought, indeed militated for and politi-
cally organized around, nationality recognition. There
are at least 15 groups who have applied and are under
consideration for nationality recognition by the State
Commission for Nationalities (guojia minzu shiwu
weiyuanhui). These groups include the Chinese Jews
(you tai ren), Khmer, Sherpas, Ku Cong, Deng (a
Tibetan sub-group), Chuanqing, and several others
(see Heberer 1990). Some 900,000 people in Guizhou
Province alone applied for minority recognition in the
early 1980s, and the 1982 census reported that
799,705 “unidentified” people remained in China. Of
interest are the Chinese Jews, once thought to be
extinct but now claiming a membership of 8,000 and
under consideration for rapid recognition due to
China’s official diplomatic ties to and improving rela-
tions with Israel. Although this group is certainly not
militant, it stands to benefit considerably from recog-
nition, perhaps leading to local-level rivalries with
other groups, particularly with Hui Muslims, to whom
many of the Chinese Jews formerly belonged. Another
group, the Ku Cong, presently classified as a branch of
the Lahu nationality in Yunnan and known as the Yel-
low Lahu, are worth noting because one of their mem-
bers, Wang Zhengcun, was the elected leader of the
Tiananmen Square Nationalities Institute’s student
democratic group and was sought and arrested as
number 3 on the most wanted list. He has long been
known as a “Ku Cong” nationalist, seeking recogni-
tion of his people, illustrating the importance of this
issue for political activism (see Gladney 1990).
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Approved for Release: 2018/06/01 C00123268