Documents / FOIA release
This Central Intelligence Agency conference report, numbered RTT 95-10039 and dated October 1995, presents the proceedings of a conference held 30 September to 1 October 1993. The CIA's Geographic Resources Division sponsored the conference. In it, academic geographers, anthropologists and US Government officials examined ethnic conflict by region, covering Eastern Europe, the former Soviet Union, Africa, Latin America, the Middle East, Asia and South Asia. The report also discusses what these conflicts mean for US policy. It does not deal with UFOs or unidentified aerial phenomena.
“Nevers”25 pages
Approved for Release: 2018/06/01 C00123268 subsequent revolutionary rule of Ayatollah Khomeini, the assassination of Anwar Sadat, and the Iraqi inva- sion of Kuwait, have had a profound effect on the entire region. Uncertainty isia certainty in Middle Eastern studies. This a priori generalization is sus- tained by another equally obzvious generalization. Each of the dictators and monarchs is mortal, and we can only speculate on what their departure might mean for the region. Taking account of the many dis- puted boundaries in the regioii (for example, Iraq-Iran, Israel-Syria, Libya-Chad, Morocco-Algeria) invites additional speculation. The diffusion within the region of various expressions of Islamic fundamentalism is‘a cause of further and more serious uncertainty. Islamic fundamentalism can result in persecution of heterodox Muslim groups, such as the Druze, Alawites, Yezidis, and Bahais, and can exacerbate the tension between Sunni and Shia Muslims and among Muslims who might be labeled variously as worldly or other-worldly, pro-Western or anti-Western, and moderate oriradical. At present, Iran is the principal exporter and coordinator of move- ments designed to subvert and eventually supplant secular authority. This movement has crossed the region’s Sunni-Shia faultline, now presents a serious threat to the Govemments of Egypt and Algeria, and is a potential threat elsewhere. Even Turkey, officially secular since the time of Ataturk, has experienced unrest inspired by Islamic zealots. Because it is mili- tary rather than civil authority that is most likely to be effective in blocking revolutionary religious move- ments, Islamic fundamentalism‘ acts both directly and indirectly in the frustration or delay of democratic development in the region. The thinly disguised Armycoup of January 1993 in Algeria is a good illustration of this principle. In spite of this recitation of circumstances that make prediction hazardous in the Middle East, it is possible to point to some happy and unhappy constants regard- ing minority groups. For example, it is safe to assume that the Arabization of the Berber areas of North Africa will continue without interruption. As a result of improvements in communication and education, mountain and desert peoples who now speak only Berber will become bilingual and eventually speak 103 only Arabic. This process of gradual, voluntary assim- ilation should also result in the Arabization of the speakers of several languages in the Sahelian zone. On the other hand, some numerically small groups, defined by either language or religion, may avoid or be able to resist assimilation, especially if they have low national visibility. The non-Iranian linguistic groups in the Zagros Mountains may exemplify this prospect. Christians will doubtless survive and even prosper in countries that are able to resist the pressures of Islamic fundamentalism. Lebanon, Syria, and pos- sibly Iraq could exemplify this prospect. The alterna- tive situation, in which non-Muslims are threatened, would occur inevitably in any country that is captured by Islamic fundamentalists. Finally, it is probably safe to assume that the problem of Palestine is not likely to be solved completely within the coming decade. The various ideas that have been entertained for solution of the Israeli-Palestinian problem seem without exception to have inherent con- tradictions. Trading land for peace presupposes Israeli willingness to trade enough land to satisfy Palestinian aspirations. This unrealistic formula also presupposes that Jewish settlers in potential Palestinian territory could be persuaded to leave. Again, Palestinians maybe willing to accept autonomy rather than indepen- dence, but only if this is a transitional rather than a permanent arrangement. Thoughts of a Palestinian- Jordanian confederation are also being entertained, but this prospect merely defers questions about the character and area of the Palestinian part of the union. Because it is not likely that Arabs will ever be able to live contentedly in a Jewish state or Jews in an Arab state and no realistic proposal has been advanced that could result in the separation of the two peoples, the Arab-Israeli problem probably will be with us for many years. The problem of Kurdistan also seems to be intractable and so can be regarded as a constant in the Middle Eastem cultural-political equation. If the area now occupied by Kurds were to become an independent state, it would be no less viable than many of the existing states in the region. It would have abundant Approved for Release: 2018/06/01 C00123268
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FOIA release, from the cia-readingroom collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is under it. 205 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.