Documents / FOIA release
This Central Intelligence Agency conference report, numbered RTT 95-10039 and dated October 1995, presents the proceedings of a conference held 30 September to 1 October 1993. The CIA's Geographic Resources Division sponsored the conference. In it, academic geographers, anthropologists and US Government officials examined ethnic conflict by region, covering Eastern Europe, the former Soviet Union, Africa, Latin America, the Middle East, Asia and South Asia. The report also discusses what these conflicts mean for US policy. It does not deal with UFOs or unidentified aerial phenomena.
“Cairo”1 page
Approved for Release: 2018/06/01 C00123268 Lebanon was created by the French as a homeland for Christian Arabs, especially the Maronites. The French began to treat the Maronites as proteges early in the 19th century when Paris was competing with London for economic and political influence in the Middle East. In 1860 the French intervened militarily to pro- tect their clients during a Muslim-Christian civil war. After that intervention the Maronite area enjoyed priv- ileged status as an autonomous province of the Otto- man Empire. The dismemberment of the Empire after World War I permitted the French to exercise direct control over this district and also over the much larger adjacent tenitory of Syria. The French desire to create a state for their Christian proteges posed an interesting dilemma. The territory occupied predominantly by Maronites (roughly the northwestern quarter of mod- ern Lebanon) would have been too small to be an effective state. Therefore, they added land from their Syrian mandate and announced the birth of a “Greater Lebanon,” three times the size of the Maronite area. This larger territory included a substantial number of Sunni and Shia Muslims, non-Maronite Christians, and Druze. A French-sponsored census of 1932 suggested that Christians formed a slight majority of the population of Greater Lebanon and that Maronites, with about 30 percent of the total, were the largest specific group. This was Lebanon‘s only formal census, and a vast array of subsequent problems can be traced to doubts about its accuracy. Suggestions that a new census should be made were checked by insistence that Maronites and other Christians “temporarily living abroad” should also be counted. Because the number of Christian Lebanese abroad could be ascertained only by those remaining in Lebanon, that prospect was never accepted by Muslims. The absence of believable data on the size of religious groups in a country where citizenship was defined by religion and political power, and even minor govemment positions, were allocated on the basis of religious affiliation inhibited the development of any collective sense of national identity. The list of problems inspired by the census contro- versy is long and melancholy. For example, the ten- dency of each religious group to try to get more than its dubious “official” share of govemment largess encouraged persistent tension. Moreover, because the Lebanese who found employment abroad and sent remittances from abroad were almost exclusively Christians, the country soon developed a pattern of extreme disparity in standards of living. The deeply rural Shia areas of southwestern and northeastern Leb- anon were conspicuously backward. Even in the more prosperous Christian districts, democracy was com- promised by nepotism and the inability of elected leaders to think of national rather than sectarian inter- ests. If Lebanon hadbeen able to remain aloof from the Arab-Israeli conflict, its tensions and ambiguities might have been countered by faith that the country was somehow better off than its neighbors. When Pal- estinian refugees acquired sufficient strength in Leba- non to wage their battle from Lebanon, the tottering Humpty Dumpty created by the French could not remain on the wall. The reason why the country disin- tegrated so rapidly can be explained not only by its inherent cultural problems but also by the ineffective- ness of the small national army, which consisted mainly of Christian officers and Muslim enlisted men. Caught in the crossfire of Palestinians already in Leb- anon, Israelis who felt free to attack them anywhere in Lebanon, and Syrian “deterrent” forces that occupied the eastern half~of Lebanon, it is no wonder that the Lebanese Army went AWOL. With its departure the Lebanese Govemment, no longer able to protect its citizens, could not prevent the proliferation of divisive militias and the beginning of a civil war—immensely complicated by foreign interventions——that led to the de facto partition of Lebanon into areas controlled by Maronites, Shiites, Syrians, Israelis, and Palestinians. The Middle East in the Coming Decade Scholars devoted to the Middle East have often been able to offer convincing retrospective explanations of developments in this complex and troubled region. Examples ofsuccessful prediction are more difficult to find. Within the past two decades, surprising events, such as the collapse of the regime of the Shah, the 102 Approved for Release: 2018/06/01 C00123268
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FOIA release, from the cia-readingroom collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is above. 205 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.