(Estimated Pub Date) the Challenge of Ethnic Conflict to National and International Order in the 1990S: Geographic Perspectives- October 1995

Approved for Release: 2018/06/01 C00123268
Iraq exemplify this situation, in spite of claims made
on behalf of autonomy for them by Assyrian immi-
grant groups in the United States. Nor have the Arabs
of southeastern Turkey or in the Khuzistan Province
of Iran posed a serious threat to Turkish or Iranian
authority. Indeed, when the Iraqis invaded Iran in
1980 they expected the Arabic:-speakers of Khuzistan
to welcome liberation from Iranian rule. Instead, as
Shiites, the Arabs in this part of Iran had good reason
to see benefit in the rule of Ayatollah Khomeini and
danger for them in the Sunni or secular bias of the
government of Saddam Husayn. The same religious
bond explains why the Azeri of northern Iran rejected
the prospect of merger with th'e neighboring Soviet
Republic of Azerbaijan during World War II.
The Problem of Kurdistan ,
Estimates of the number of Kurds vary widely, from
less than l5 million to more than 30 million. In the
negotiations that accompanied the division of the
Ottoman Empire after World War I, various prospects
were suggested for the Kurdsfranging from local
autonomy to independence. In fact, they became a
shadow nation in northwestern Iran, northem Iraq, and
southeastern Turkey. During World War II, when
Soviet troops occupied northern Iran, Kurds enjoyed
some autonomy and, under the Mahabad Republic of
1946, even a brief period of nominal independence. In
1974, after several years of civil war, Kurds in north-
ern Iraq were granted a high degree of autonomy,
including recognition of the coequal status of Kurdish
and Arabic as official languages of the region. Most of
the provisions of this agreement were never imple-
mented, and Kurdish autononiy became a dead issue
when the Iran-Iraq war began Lin 1980. In Turkey,
Kurds, often called “Mountain Turks,” have sought to
achieve recognition and hence to resist assimilation.
Kurdish nationalism in Turkey developed in response
to denial of such recognition and the enforcement of
laws inspired by Article 57 of, the Turkish constitu-
tion, which forbids “activities_that aim at destroying
the ethnic unity of the Turkish' people.” In response to
the Gulf war and some pressure from the European
Community, the Turkish Government is now enter-
taining thoughts of at least qualified recognition of the
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Kurdish people and the lifting of some of the restric-
tions on the use of the Kurdish language.
Kurds have adopted different strategies for promotion
of their cause, depending on opportunities available in
the countries where they reside. They have seldom
expressed enthusiasm for the benefits of Iranian, Iraqi,
or 'Ilurkish citizenship. It is Kurdish citizenship that
they desire or at least autonomy as a transitional stage
en route to independence. The frustration of Kurdish
nationalism has been a consequence of its collision
with Iranian, Iraqi, and Turkish nationalism. The loca-
tion of the Kirkuk oilfield in northem Iraq is an addi-
tional complication. Kurdish successional aims in Iraq
have been supported by Iran and, to a lesser extent, by
Turkey, while Kurdish nationalism in both these coun-
tries has been suppressed. Because assimilation is
rejected by Kurdish leaders, Kurdistan is and doubt-
less will remain a nonstate nation.
Kurdish nationalism is an even more intractable prob-
lem than Palestinian nationalism. Although the latter
problem has a large intemational dimension, it relates
essentially to the relationship between two nonassimi-
lable peoples: Arabs and Jews. The nonstate status of
Kurdistan derives from a more complicated relation-
ship among Kurds and Arabs, Turks, and Iranians. In
each case they have been or can be regarded as candi-
dates for absorption. Although autonomy may be a
realizable aspiration, independence within a territory
relinquished by three states is difficult to imagine.
Kurdistan is best described, therefore, as a cultural
geographic reality that happens coincidentally to be a
political geographic impossibility.
Lebanon in Retrospect
The disastrous conflict in Lebanon offers a useful
focus for examination of the circumstances that can
transform instability, present in many Middle Eastern
countries, into warfare. For three decades Lebanon
seemed to be functioning not only as a plural society
but, more remarkably, also as the world’s only plural-
istic theocracy. We now know that it was only an
unsuccessful experiment.
Approved for Release: 2018/06/01 C00123268