Documents / FOIA release

Soviet Public Treatment of President Reagan Since November 1980

Central Intelligence Agency · 1984-02-03 · 36 pages · text by GLM-OCR

This Central Intelligence Agency report, dated 3 February 1984, reviews how Soviet leaders, well-connected commentators and routine media treated President Reagan from November 1980 onward. It finds that Moscow twice softened its line: once after the 1980 election and again when Andropov came to power. After the Korean airliner was shot down, Soviet treatment of Reagan became the most abusive in years. Attached excerpts include a Yakovlev article claiming Reagan believes in flying saucers.

  • p. 20 …It seems to me that soon we will have to confront a harder line of this…

Read from the scan by GLM-OCR; expect the odd misread word.

173. "I. Aleksandrov," pseudonym used in officially inspired articles (PRAVDA, 25 Mar 81)

174. Regretfully, from their very first public statements and practical steps the leaders of the new U.S. Government appear to be bent not on rectifying but on multiplying the errors of the previous administration, on facilitating not a lessening of international tension but its growth. . . .

175. The leaders of the Washington Administration and some hawkish lawmakers are now engaged in a competition of belligerent phraseology, are trying to outdo one another by the hugeness of military programs.

## 176. Bovin (Soviet television, 29 Mar 81)

177. I now think that the essential outlines of the new foreign policy course, of Reagan's foreign policy, have now become sufficiently visible. It is a harsh, conservative, power policy, it is a policy whose cornerstone comprises extremely primitive anticommunist concepts. In general the views of Reagan and his supporters on world developments are extremely simple: Anything they do not like, anything that is contrary to the interests of imperialism, they say is all the result of the insidious actions of the Soviet Union. From this primitive package a simple conclusion is drawn: The time for playing at detente is over, it is necessary to rearm immediately, it is necessary to strive for military strategic superiority over the Soviet Union, and on this basis impose the will of America the Great on the whole world.

178. Well, this is approximately the philosophy. Let us now examine the practice. We all know that during the past decade, let us say, despite all the difficulties and complexities, between the Soviet Union and the United States there became established a fairly well-developed structure of mutual relations which was formulated in dozens of different agreements. Now the new Administration is beginning to break up this structure and deal a mean blow to its foundation, the process of strategic arms limitation.

## 179. Arbatov (PRAVDA, 4 May 81)

180. Most observers agree that, even by late April, no in any way coherent U.S. foreign policy has emerged--at any rate when it comes to actions. There have been plenty of words and rhetoric--so much that the Administration itself has more than once had to backpedal. But can words and rhetoric be regarded as policy?

181. They probably can be, in some respects.

Not linked to a story yet.

About this file

FOIA release, from the cia-readingroom collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is above. The text was read from the page images by GLM-OCR; expect the odd misread word. 36 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.