Documents / FOIA release
This Central Intelligence Agency report, dated 3 February 1984, reviews how Soviet leaders, well-connected commentators and routine media treated President Reagan from November 1980 onward. It finds that Moscow twice softened its line: once after the 1980 election and again when Andropov came to power. After the Korean airliner was shot down, Soviet treatment of Reagan became the most abusive in years. Attached excerpts include a Yakovlev article claiming Reagan believes in flying saucers.
“Cooper”9 pages
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Document 2 of 2 AGAL Concatenated Database minds and hearts of billions of people in the world. And the future of mankind depends in no small measure on the outcome of this ideological struggle. ...It is no less important to skillfully expose the lying, subversive nature of imperialist propaganda. . . . 105. On the one hand, as has already been said, the aggressiveness of ultrareactionary forces led by U.S. imperialism has sharply increased. Attempts are being made to reverse the course of events at all costs. Of course, this policy will not bring imperialists success but, being adventuristic, it is extremely dangerous to mankind. This is why it is meeting with powerful opposition on the part of the peoples, which, undoubtedly, will grow even further. 106. In the present-day capitalist world, however, there are also other trends and other politicians who take a more realistic account of the international situation. 107. Gromyko, TASS interview (PRAVDA, 22 Jun 83) 108. Naturally, a [summit] meeting which could produce major results for both bilateral Soviet-U.S. relations and the international situation would be useful. 109. Quite a few words are now being said in the West, particularly in Washington, about a Soviet-American summit. An outsider can even get the impression that Washington is indeed giving serious thought to such a meeting. But if we look into the crux of the matter, the situation, regrettably, is different. 110. Obviously, proper preconditions are needed to hold a meeting of the top leaders of the two major powers. First, it is necessary to have a certain degree of mutual understanding on major issues which are fundamental to the state of relations between the two countries and the overall international situation. There also is a need for the desire of both sides actually to strive for positive developments, or even better, for a breakthrough in their mutual relations. 111. If we consider the state of affairs from this point of view, it becomes clear that the discourses of American figures on a meeting are not backed by anything. U.S. policy on relations with the Soviet Union does not pursue any constructive goals at all, of which American leaders make no secret. Moreover, it is oriented in the totally opposite direction. 112. When there appear in American politics real signs of a readiness to conduct affairs in a serious and constructive manner, the question of the possibility of a summit will appear in a different light.
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FOIA release, from the cia-readingroom collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is above. The text was read from the page images by GLM-OCR; expect the odd misread word. 36 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.