Documents / FOIA release
This Central Intelligence Agency report, dated 1 June 1984 and marked unclassified for official use only, reviews how Soviet leaders and media treated President Reagan from November 1980 through May 1984. It finds that Moscow twice moderated its rhetoric to test prospects for better relations, and that attacks became the most abusive in two decades after the South Korean airliner shootdown. The report compiles authoritative Soviet statements and midlevel and routine media commentary as a baseline for analysts.
“Cooper”12 pages
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Document 1 of 2 AGAL Concatenated Database to deal preemptive strikes. Militarist Japan was following the same doctrine in attacking Pearl Harbor. Such methods brought no success to past exponents of international terrorism, but they did cause the suffering and death of tens of millions of people. Today, in the nuclear age, their consequences could be immeasurably more tragic. 409. TASS commentary (TASS, 3 May 84) 410. President Reagan's visit to the PRC has drawn to a close. The U.S. Administration was striving to use it to the fullest possible extent as an election-year visit and for the realization of its hegemonistic plans in the Asian and Far Eastern region. . . . 411. Reagan and his Administration, taking account of the continuing election campaign in the U.S.A., wanted to use the "China factor" to the full to further its plans, to play the "China card," above all, in the context of confrontation with the Soviet Union in the Asia-and-Pacific region, to broaden out, in Reagan's words, areas of coinciding and parallel interests with China, to carry on with the coordination of actions with China on a series of issues in the international arena. 412. The American President was in every way trying to give his talks and, especially, his public statements, a provocative anti-Soviet orientation. This came as a fresh confirmation of the militarist course steered by the U.S. Administration and of its reluctance to seek agreement with the Soviet Union, including on disarmament issues. In doing so, Reagan speculatively assured the Chinese leadership that the U.S.A. would never consent to sign an agreement with the Soviet Union on the reduction or elimination of nuclear armaments in Europe, if the Soviet missiles deployed in Asia remained unaffected. . . ## 413. TASS report (TASS, 6 May 84) 414. R. Reagan, the United States President, has come forward with a new demagogic statement timed for the beginning of the second round of the Stockholm Conference on measures for strengthening confidence, security, and disarmament in Europe. . . . 415. Reagan also touted other U.S. pseudo-initiatives, including the draft treaty on chemical weapons tabled at Geneva whose purpose is to camouflage the Pentagon's policy of stepping up the rate of production, updating and stockpiling this monstrous means of dealing a strike against people. The U.S. draft is aimed, under the pretext of monitoring, at legalizing U.S. intelligence-gathering activity. 416. Reagan's assurances of the wish "to hold serious talks" look
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FOIA release, from the cia-readingroom collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is above. The text was read from the page images by GLM-OCR; expect the odd misread word. 56 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.