Documents / FOIA release
This Central Intelligence Agency report, dated 1 June 1984 and marked unclassified for official use only, reviews how Soviet leaders and media treated President Reagan from November 1980 through May 1984. It finds that Moscow twice moderated its rhetoric to test prospects for better relations, and that attacks became the most abusive in two decades after the South Korean airliner shootdown. The report compiles authoritative Soviet statements and midlevel and routine media commentary as a baseline for analysts.
“Cooper”12 pages
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Document 1 of 2 AGAL Concatenated Database belief that for that period of time we will not succeed in reaching an agreement on anything meaningful. We will, of course, conduct negotiations, we will try to sign agreements and we will probably even succeed somewhere on the political fringes. However, I think that concerning the main and basic issues we will have to face a game of nerves, confrontation, and conflicts for another four years. This is not a very optimistic prospect. I would very much like to be wrong but I can draw no other conclusion at present. 367. Fedor Burlatskiy, Literaturnaya Gazeta political observer and CPSU Central Committee official (Literaturnaya Gazeta, 4 Jan 84) 368. It is impossible to deny that a serious turnabout occurred in U.S. geopolitics on the threshold of the eighties, or that the United States has completely rejected the very idea of detente and has embarked on the path of global confrontation with the Soviet Union. . . . 369. It is well known that this shift is basically linked with the arrival of President Reagan in the White House, a man with extremely reactionary views representing the interests of the "iron triangle"-the military business, the Pentagon, and the militarist wing in the U.S. Congress. . . 370. [Whether the present militarist course in the United States is irreversible] is a very complicated question. Much depends on whether R. Reagan manages to win the forthcoming U.S. election in the fall of 1984. Much also depends on the correlation of forces within the framework of the U.S. economic and political elite and on public opinion in that country. 371. R. Reagan is hastening to consolidate the basic foundations of militarism for the future. He is inflating the military budget and planning programs for new types of weapons. Nonetheless, political forces in the United States and the U.S. people still have not had their final say. I am convinced that ordinary people in the United States fear thermonuclear war no less than other people in the world. 372. TASS report on President Reagan's State of the Union Address (TASS, 26 Jan 84) 373. President Ronald Reagan made a traditional "State of the Union" address to a joint meeting of the two houses of Congress. His statement, made in a spirit of electioneering, was an attempt to picture in a favorable light the results of his three-year rule and justify his policy, marked by extreme aggressiveness in the international field and total disregard for the needs of the common people in the home policy field.
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FOIA release, from the cia-readingroom collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is above. The text was read from the page images by GLM-OCR; expect the odd misread word. 56 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.