Documents / FOIA release

Soviet Public Treatment of President Reagan

Central Intelligence Agency · 1984-06-01 · 56 pages · text by GLM-OCR

This Central Intelligence Agency report, dated 1 June 1984 and marked unclassified for official use only, reviews how Soviet leaders and media treated President Reagan from November 1980 through May 1984. It finds that Moscow twice moderated its rhetoric to test prospects for better relations, and that attacks became the most abusive in two decades after the South Korean airliner shootdown. The report compiles authoritative Soviet statements and midlevel and routine media commentary as a baseline for analysts.

  • p. 40 …It is not hard to understand what is guiding the Pentagon's thinkers. 315. They are…
  • p. 47 …representing the interests of the "iron triangle"-the military business, the Pentagon, and the militarist wing…
  • p. 52 …the draft treaty on chemical weapons tabled at Geneva whose purpose is to camouflage the Pentagon…
  • p. 55 …The Pentagon spokesmen nevertheless note that the travel time of the missiles on new Soviet submarines…

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world is divided into opposing sociopolitical systems? Is the "Reagan phenomenon" an accident? The questions are not farfetched. The difficulties are indeed huge. Militarism and aggressiveness are inherent in imperialism. We do not choose our partners; fate, history hands them to us.

329. All that is true. Nonetheless, the hope is realistic. The hope is realistic because the forces advocating that detente get a "second wind" represent a real, weighty factor in world politics. The Soviet Union is a mighty power. People across the Atlantic cannot help but take this into account--whatever team is assembled in the White House, it is still not a suicide team. The socialist community and the communist and workers' parties are with us. Dozens of nonaligned states advocate detente and disarmament and oppose the division of the world into military-political blocs. The antinuclear, antiwar movement is gaining unprecedented scope and its social and political spectrum is becoming increasingly broad. . . .

330. I repeat, we would like to reach agreement, even with Reagan. What if this does not happen? We will wait.

331. Shishlin (Soviet domestic radio, 21 Nov 82)

332. Actions for the benefit of peace would carry a lot more weight than conciliatory words. If we were to see a real shift in the American position at the talks that are being held on strategic armaments, on European armaments, on conventional armaments in Central Europe--that would surely be more substantial than the words spoken by the American statesmen. So the situation remains pretty difficult. . . .

333. Pravda editorial (Pravda, 21 Nov 82)

334. Judging by international reactions, Andropov's meetings with foreign delegations gave new impetus to people's hopes for the maintenance and development of the detente process. The Soviet Union is always ready for honest, equal, and mutually advantageous cooperation with any state which wishes it, particularly with the United States. Normal, or better still, friendly Soviet-American relations would accord with the interests of both peoples and of world peace.

335. Gennadiy Gerasimov, Novosti deputy chairman (Soviet television, 28 Nov 82)

336. The events of the last weeks in Moscow, by the very nature of things, have caused a certain pause in international relations. The world has been watching Moscow to see what will happen and, in its turn, Moscow has been watching the world attentively, too. American

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FOIA release, from the cia-readingroom collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is above. The text was read from the page images by GLM-OCR; expect the odd misread word. 56 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.