Documents / FOIA release
This Central Intelligence Agency report, dated 1 June 1984 and marked unclassified for official use only, reviews how Soviet leaders and media treated President Reagan from November 1980 through May 1984. It finds that Moscow twice moderated its rhetoric to test prospects for better relations, and that attacks became the most abusive in two decades after the South Korean airliner shootdown. The report compiles authoritative Soviet statements and midlevel and routine media commentary as a baseline for analysts.
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186. Far from all the leaders of Western countries and influential political parties approve the adventurism of the U.S. Administration. It worries a considerable segment of the U.S. public itself as well. They are realizing ever more clearly there that the intensive militarization and the aggravation of the international situation have not brought nor are going to bring the USA military superiority and political achievements. They only lead everywhere in the world to the escalation of criticism of Washington's belligerent course. . . 187. Regrettably, the United States has turned its participation in talks on this subject into a tool of propaganda to camouflage the arms race and cold war policy. We will not participate in this game. The Americans created obstacles to the talks both on "European" and on strategic nuclear weapons by deploying their missiles in Europe. It is the removal of these obstacles (which would also remove the need for measures taken in response) that offers the way to working out a mutually acceptable accord. 188. The U.S. Administration has lately begun to make peaceable sounding statements, urging us to enter into a "dialogue." 189. Attention was drawn worldwide to the fact that these statements are in sharp conflict with everything that the present United States Administration has said and, which is the main thing, done and continues doing in its relations with the Soviet Union. Assurances of its good intentions can be taken seriously only if they are substantiated with real actions. 190. Chernenko, speech at dinner for Ethiopian leader Mengistu (Pravda, 30 Mar 84) 191. In order to camouflage its policy the American Administration is now trying in every way to pass itself off as a "lover of peace." However, everyone can see the real value of such posturing. Recently the Soviet Union expressed readiness to reach agreement with other nuclear powers to jointly recognize norms regulating relations between them which should eventually contribute to the reduction and subsequent liquidation of nuclear armaments. How did the United States respond to this? I must say that no reply has come from Washington to this proposal. 192. The value of the lofty phrases about U.S. readiness to work for lessening international tension and to act in a spirit of restraint and nonuse of force or the threat of force can be clearly seen from the example of Nicaragua, against which the American special services and their hirelings are waging an undeclared war. They are
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FOIA release, from the cia-readingroom collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is above. The text was read from the page images by GLM-OCR; expect the odd misread word. 56 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.