Documents / FOIA release
This Central Intelligence Agency report, dated 1 June 1984 and marked unclassified for official use only, reviews how Soviet leaders and media treated President Reagan from November 1980 through May 1984. It finds that Moscow twice moderated its rhetoric to test prospects for better relations, and that attacks became the most abusive in two decades after the South Korean airliner shootdown. The report compiles authoritative Soviet statements and midlevel and routine media commentary as a baseline for analysts.
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Document 1 of 2 AGAL Concatenated Database at all costs. Of course, this policy will not bring imperialists success but, being adventuristic, it is extremely dangerous to mankind. This is why it is meeting with powerful opposition on the part of the peoples, which, undoubtedly, will grow even further. 111. In the present-day capitalist world, however, there are also other trends and other politicians who take a more realistic account of the international situation. 112. Foreign Minister Andrey Gromyko, TASS interview (Pravda, 22 Jun 83) 113. Naturally, a [summit] meeting which could produce major results for both bilateral Soviet-U.S. relations and the international situation would be useful. 114. Quite a few words are now being said in the West, particularly in Washington, about a Soviet-American summit. An outsider can even get the impression that Washington is indeed giving serious thought to such a meeting. But if we look into the crux of the matter, the situation, regrettably, is different. 115. Obviously, proper preconditions are needed to hold a meeting of the top leaders of the two major powers. First, it is necessary to have a certain degree of mutual understanding on major issues which are fundamental to the state of relations between the two countries and the overall international situation. There also is a need for the desire of both sides actually to strive for positive developments, or even better, for a breakthrough in their mutual relations. 116. If we consider the state of affairs from this point of view, it becomes clear that the discourses of American figures on a meeting are not backed by anything. U.S. policy on relations with the Soviet Union does not pursue any constructive goals at all, of which American leaders make no secret. Moreover, it is oriented in the totally opposite direction. 117. When there appear in American politics real signs of a readiness to conduct affairs in a serious and constructive manner, the question of the possibility of a summit will appear in a different light. 118. TASS statement on Korean airliner incident (Pravda, 3 Sep 83) 119. The intrusion into Soviet airspace by the aforementioned plane cannot be regarded in any other way than a preplanned act. It was obviously thought possible to attain special intelligence aims without hindrance using civilian planes as a cover.
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FOIA release, from the cia-readingroom collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is above. The text was read from the page images by GLM-OCR; expect the odd misread word. 56 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.